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him in submitting the case under as clear an exposition of the
]aw as the able judges who presided at the trial could have
given, and to not a few the withdrawal of the case from the
jury seemed to imply an apprehension that its submission
might at least have resulted in a disagreement and the consequent labor and expense of a new trial. It is certain that
no such consideration ought ever to influence the court, and
in fact that no criminal case ought ever to be taken from the
jury; because if there be any doubt about the facts in the
case they ought c6rtainly to pass upon them. and if there be
no doubt they are certain to acquit.
On an examination of the criminal laws of the other States,
so far as I have been able to make such examination, I find
the general rule to be in this country as in England, that the
State has no right of review by "writ of error or appeal except
as provided b& statute, and no such right is secured in a
large majority of the States.
The only States in which this right is secured are Arkansas, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky and Tennessee, while in all the other States such right of review is
secured exclusively to the accused.
T. BURWELL.
NEw YORK.
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COMMERCIAL BANK OF KENTUCKY V. VARNUM.
It Is settled law in New York that a bill of exchange drawn In one State upon
a person in another is a foreign bill.
At common law the rule is that presentment and demand of payment of a
foreign bill must be made by the notary in person, but this rule may be varied
by evidence of a usage universal in the place where the bill is payable for the
clerk of the notary to make such presentment and demand.
The statute of New York (L. 1857, chap. 416), declaring that days of grace shall
not attach to bills of exchange, etc., which are "on their face" payablein "days"
after date, or on specided. day, does not apply to bills made payable on their fao
in months after date.
A bill of exchange which is not entitled to grace, falling due on a public bollday, is payable on the day following.
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The Commercial Bank of Kentucky sued Joseph B. Varnum, Jr., in the New York Supreme ourt, for negligence in
protesting a bill of exchange, while acting as a Notary
Public.
The facts on which the suit was-brought were as follows:
On September 4, 1860, William A. Barkesdale & Co, of
St. Louis, Missouri, drew their bill of exchange, dated at that
place, upon the Park Bank of the city of New York, for
$10,000, payable in four months after date (acceptance waived), to the order of John F. Darby, by whom it was indorsed
to the plaintiff. It was sent to the Metropolitan Bank inNew York city,' and placed by that bank when due in the
hands of the defendant, who was then a notary public, for
the purpose of being presented, and, if necessary, protested
by him.
The defendant gave the bill to his partner, 31r. P. W. Turney, who presented it for payment, which was refused, and
on the same day an entry was made in the defendant's protest
book under the joint supervision of the Idefendant and of Mr.
Turney, stating that the bill was presented and protested by
the defendant; Mr. Turney's name not being mentioned.
This was signed by the defendant, while Mr. Turney put his
initials opposite. The defendant forthwith made out a formal
protest, reciting that he had presented the bill. In point oi
fact, he never did present it. He forthwith sent the usual
notices of protest.
The drawers of the bill had become utterly insolvent.
The indorser was perfectly solvent. He resisted the efforts
of the plaintiff to collect the bill, upon the ground that there
had been no valid protest; and the courts of Missouri decided in his favor. See Commercial Bank of Kfentucky v.
Barcesdale, 36 Missouri, 563.

While that suit was pending, and about two years after Mr.
Varnum's protest, Mr. Turney made out a formal protest of
iFour months from Sept. 4tb, 1860, would be Jan. 4th, 1861. But that day was
set apart by the President of the United States as a day of public fasting and
lbayer, and by the laws of New York (Laws 1849, ch. 261), such fast days are ob.
served as Sundays. Demand was accordingly made Jan.5th, 1861.
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the bill in his own name, and this was used in evidence
against Mr. Darby, but without effect.
The defendant gave evidence tending to show a usage or
custom among notaries and bankers in the city of New York,
to tteat bills like the one in question as inland bills, and to
make and receive protests of such bills, signed by the notary,
when presentation was, in fact, made by his clerk. This
evidence, being received under exception, was finally stricken
out as incompetent.
The court below gave judgment for the plaintiff in the
full amount claimed; and the defendant appealed to the
general term. See the opinion there and also the opinion of
thejudge at the trial reported in 3 Lansing 86. The judgment
being there affirmed, the defendant brought this appeal.
Noah Davis, for appellant.
T. G. S earman, for respondent.

I. The bill was a foreign bill of exchange. Buckner v.
Finley, 2 Peters 586; Dickins v. Beal, 10 Peters 572, 579;
Bank of U. S. v. Daniel,12 Peters 32, 54; Phenix Bank
v. russey, 12 Pick. 483; Chenowith v. Chamberlin, 6 B. Monr.
60; Rice v. Hogan, 8 Dana, 133, 134; Green v. Jackson, 15
Maine 136; Freeman's Bank v. Perkins, 18 Maine 292; State
Bank v. Hayes, 3 Ind. 400; Aborn v. Bosworth, 1 R. 1. 401;
Commercial Bank v. Barkesdale, 36 Mo. 563; Bank of Cale
Fear v.Sltinemetz, 1 Hill [S. 0.], 44; 3 Kent Com. 63. talliday v. fcDougal, 22 Wend. 264, 272; Carter v. Burley, 9

N. H. 558, 566; Brown v. Ferguson,4 Leigh 37, 51.
II. The bill in question being a foreign bill, the defendant
in undertaking as a notary to present and protest it, undertook an official act in his capacity as such notary. Townsley
v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 170; Bryden v. Taylor, 2 Harr. & J., 963;
Chanoine"v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173; "Gale v. Walsh, 5 T. R.,
239; Phcenix Bank v. Russey, 12 Pick. 483; Commercial
Bank v. Barkesdale, 36 Mo., 563; Union Bank v. Hyde, 6

Wheat. 572.
III. The defendant, having undertaken to act in his official
capacity, could not delegate his powers to any other person.
Story on Agency, § 14; Ess v. Truscott, 2 Mees & W. 385;
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Powell v. Tuttle, 3 N. Y., 396, 407; Newton v. Bronson, 18
N. Y., 587, 593.
This rule is peculiarly applicable to the case of a notary.
He is intrusted with special powers, which he is sworn to
discharge faithfully. His certificate is consequently accepted
over all the world as evidence of the due presentation of a
,bill of exchange.
It has been repeatedly adjudged that a notary must pereonally present a bill which he intends to protest, that be
cannot delegate his authority to a clerk or agent, and that a
protest made after presentment by a clerk only is utterly void.
Onondaga Bank v. Bates 3 Hill, 53; Hunt v. Maybee, 7 N.
Y. 266; Chenowith v.' Chamberlin,'6 B. Monr. 60; Carmi-.
chaelv. Bank of Penna., 4 How. (Miss.) 567; Sacrider v.
Brown 3 McLean 481; Commercial Bank v. Barkedale 36
Mo. 563; Cubbs v. Adams, 13 Gray 37; Warnick v. Crane,
4 Denio 460.'
There is not a single decision to the contrary, unless we
except NeL-on v. Fotterall,7 Leigh 179, in which one of the
judges expressed the opinion that a clerk regularly employed
by the notary might present bills for him. But another
judge expressed an opposite opinion, and it is clear that the
court, as such, did not pass upon the question. We have examined all the other cases cited by the defendant's counsel on
this point, and find that, without eyception, the instruments
upon which the controversy arose were inland bills or promissory notes, which might, of course, be presented by any
one, and these cases have therefcre no bearing upon the present controversy.
IV. Evidence of a custom among notaries in New York city
to make demand of payment of foreign bills by their clerks was
inadmissible, as such a custom, if it existed, would be void, as
contraryto law. It is well settled that a custom directly opposed
to the law is void. And by this it is not meant simply that it is
IThe New York cases here cited were decided under the statute of 1833, which
made a notary's protest of an inland bill evidence to the same extent as in the
case of a foreign bill.
The other cases all turned upon the validity of the protest of foreign bills, and
are direct authorities upon the precise point involved in this cause.
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void if criminal, or if established for the purpose of evading
the law, or if contrary to a statute. The whole mercantile
law is founded upon custom; but wheh a custom is once so well
established as to be judicially recognized, it becomes law, and
cannot be changed by the introduction of a new custom.
Allen v. iferchants' Bank 15 Wend. 482 ; Edie v. East India
CO*, 2 Burr. 1216.
A signal instance of the strict application of this principle may be found,in the attempt which has been twice made
to dispense with days of grace by proof of usage. The allowance of these days is based purely upon a mercantile custom,
in direct contradiction of the written contract. Yet, this cus.
tomhaving been judicially established, the courts have absolutely refused to receive evidence of a new mercantile custom
in opposition to it. WVoodruff v. Merchants' Bank, 25 Wend.
673; 6 Hill 174; Bowen v. Newell, 8 N. Y., 190.1
Evidence of custom has been excluded in all other similai
oses, where it was sought thereby to vary a fixed rule of law.
United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. [U. S.] 83, 102; Beirne
v. D ord,5 N. Y. 102; Otsego Bank v. Marren, 18 Barb. 290; 2
Suydam v. Clar7, 2 Sand. 133; Brown v. Jackson, 2 Wash.
C. 0., 24; Coxe v. Heislay, 19 Penn. St. 243.
The opinion of the.court was delivered by
PEcKHAm J.-It is insisted by defendant's counsel that the
presentment and demand of payment of the draft were prop.
erly made by the clerk of the defendant, the notary. This
was a foreign bill of exchange, being drawn in the State of
Kentucky, upon a bank in the city of New York. This has
been long settled by authority. Dickins v. Beal, 10 Peters
572; Bank of U. S. v. Daniel,12 Peters 32; Phanix Bank
1On a second trial of this cause the plaintiff proved the existence of a statute
in Connecticut (the law of which governed the contract) which expressly prescribed that the allowance of days of grace should be regulated by usage. On
this evidence he was allowed to prove the usage of all the banks in the &ate
(Bowen v. 2ewell 2 Duer, 584; afllrmed, 13 N. Y., 290). The stringent rule thus
laid down only strengthens our position.
2In the Otsego Bank case it was expressly held that a usage among notaries
'cannot be allowed to control the rules of law in respect to commercial paper,
nor make that a valid demand which the law declare not to be valid" (18 Barb.,

295).
.,
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v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Peters 586;
Halliday v. HcDougal, 20 Wend. 81; S. C. 22 Id. 264.
It being a foreign bill,.a protest was indispensable to a recovery against the indorser. Holliday v. McDougal, supra
and cases there cited. Dennistown v. Stewart, 17 How. U. S.
606; Phcenix Bank v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483; 3 Kent. Com.
2d. Ed. 93 and note.
Has then a notary's clerk any authority to make the presentment and demand of payment of a foreign bill?
This presentment and demand for the purposes of protest
are practically of no moment to any one, as bills are always
dishonored before they are handed to a notary to protest.
They have always been first presented and payment refused,
and are then delivered over for protest, Ohitty on Bills, 13 Ed.
457. The only practical benefit to any one is the notice of
the dishonor to the prior parties to the bill, to enable them
to protect themselves. It may possibly at some time be of
some importance as evidence of the dishonor. Whethe;
practically beneficial or not however, as the law requires
it, it must be done.
Considering the rule at common law to be, in the absence
of any custom or usage on the subject that the presentment
and demand must be made by the notary in person, was the
testimony offered of the universal usage in the city of New
York for the clerk of the notary to make such presentment
and demand admissible?
It may be remarked that the usage of merchants has es.
tablished the great- body of the law in reference to bills of
exchange.
It gave grace to such bills and thus changed the contract.
It has thus settled the particular time of demand by the
notary. The rule of law that required a. protest of a foreign
bill is wholly founded upon the custom of merchants. Dennistown v. Stewart, 17 How. 606.
In the absence of any established rule of law in this State.
by decision of the courts, or by any statute requiring a demand to be made by a notary in person, it is not perceived
why a usage such as was offered was not admissible as proof
upon the subject. This was the view of the learned justice
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who trieel this case, but he was of opinion that the law had
been otherwise settled in this State. In this I think he was
clearly in error. All the decisions referred to by him or upon
the argument at bar were confined to the admissibility of
certificates of pr6test and notice of bills and notes under the
statute of i833. (Laws of 1833, 394 Chap. 271). That
statute made no provision as to what constituted a protest,
but provided simply what the notary's certificate should
primafacie prove, and had no reference whatever to the admissibility of this offered evidence, or to the duties of notaries
at common law, in protesting a foreign bill-such as Onondaga County Bank v. Bates, 3 Hill 53; Cole v. Jessul, 9

Barb. 395; affirmed in Ct. of App., 10 N. Y. 96; Warwick
v. Crane, 4 Den. 460; Hunt v. Maybee, 7 N. Y. 266; Gaw.try v. Doane, 48 Barb. 148.

The ,counselfor the plaintiff to sustain the exclusion of this
evidence refers to Chenowith v. C6hamberlin, 6 B. Monr6e 60;
Sacrider v. Brown, 3 McLean 481; Commercial Bank. v.
Barkesdale, 36 Mo., 563 at p. 573 ; Cribbs v. Adams, 13 Gray
597; Carmichael v. Bank of Penna., 4 How. (Miss.) 567,

Neither case sustains his position; on the contrary each one
that speaks upon this point concedes the admissibility of the
evidence and its controlling effect. The last case makes no
allusion to the point.
The practice in England is to present and dema-nd by a
clerk of the notary, and we are not referred to an English authority holding such presentment illegal when the usage so
to present was established.
Chitty on Bills, in his last edition (10 Eng. Ed. p. 355 note
4) sustains this usage and says it is not questioned in any
English case, and "is amply justified by the law of principal
and agent." I take this from 1 Parsons on Bills, 360, as this
edition of Chitty is not accessible to me. 'This is said after
correspondence upon examination and discussion of the subject, and is free from the doubt in older editions, based chiefly
tipon a doctrine of Mr. Justice BULLER in Leftly v. Mills, 4
T. R. 170-175, an action on an inland bill.
In Brooks' Notary of England, 3 Ed. 71, published in 1867,
it is stated: "Before the protest is made, it is the custom in
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England to cause the bill to be presented either by a notary
or by his clerk (in general his clerk presents it) and acceptance to be demanded." As to the admission of usage see
Nelson v. Fotteral, 7 Leigh 179; lVitenbrger v. SIlalding, 33
Mo. 421; Commercial Bankz of Kentucky v. Barkesdale,36 Mo.

573.
It is said that this usage was not known to the plaintiff,
and hence could not be obligatory .upon it. As knowledge
by the plaintiffof this usage was not necessary to its validity,
the mode of making presentment and demand was of no sort
of moment to the plaintiff.. That mode could not have influenced the plaintiffs action. What the law requires as to a
foreign bill is a protest, and all that the owner is interested
in is that the protest should be legal.
In my judgment the evidence offered was competent and
should have been received. It is suggested that this usage
was not admissible, as it was not set up in theanswer. The
rejection was not put upon that ground, but upon the broad
merits. The question of pleading therefore is not considered,
if there be anything in it, though I confess I do not perceive
anything.
It is also urged that this bill was given to the defendant to
present on the wrong day. That there was grace upon the
bill, and hence it was due on the 4th and 7th of January, and
not on the 5th, the day of its delivery for protest. It is
probably a sufficient answer to this to say that no such point
was raised at the trial; but as a new trial must be had on the
other ground, my brethren think an opinion should be expressed on this point, as it has been fully discussed and will
necessarily arise in the case.
The Act under which the plaintiff claims that grace was
abolished, as to this bill, reads. as follows:
"All checks, bills of exchange or drafts appearing on their
face to have been drawn upon any bank or upoti any banking
association or individual bankers carrying on the banking
business, etc., which are on their face payable on any specified
day or in any number of days after the date or sight thereof,
shall be deemed due and payable on the day mentioned for
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the payment of the same without any days of grace being al.
lowed," etc. (Laws of 1857, 838, Chap. 416, 52).
Observe-the bills must not only be payable on a "specified day" or on so many "days after date or sight," but they
must "on their face " be so payable.
This language is plain and peculiafly specific. It was
obviously designed to be so. Clearly it intended to abolish
grace as to some bills, and not as to others. We must look
at its language to learn precisely upon what bills grace was
intended to be abblished.
It does not in terms include bills payable in months or in
years after date-but it is said that such bills by calculation
can be converted from months or years into days-and thus
they are included. But this mode abolishes the words "on
their face" so payable. These words are thus rendered superfluous and without meaning.
This violates a primary rule of construction; a bill
payable in two years from, its date, is not payable "on its
face " in so many days from its date.Thus it follows from the language of the Act that bills
payable "on their face" in so many months or years from
date are not payable "on their face" in so many days from
date.
The language of the Act is particular and exclusive. What
right has a court to make it general and inclusive? I think
the purpose of the Act is in harmony with its language. It
was intended, I think, to abolish grace upon short-time bills
drawn upon banks or bankers. Thus the abolition is specifically confined to bills drawn payable "on their face" "in
days," or on a "specified day," which are usually short bills.
When the bill says pay on such a day, or one day after sight,
it did not mean three days thereafter. But the holder should
get his money upon such bills at the day specified.
The construction claimed by the plaintiff would abolish
grace upon all time bills on banks or bankers-which was
never intended, or it would 'have been easily expressed. It
is also a rule that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed. Bussing v. Bushnell, 6 Hill
882 -Rue v. Alter, 5 Den. 119. Though I place but little
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emphasis upon the rule for this construction. The case of
Leftly v. Mills, 4 T. R. 170, throws light upon this question.
The Act there provided for a protest of bills, etc., payable in
days "after date," but the bill was payable "fourteen days after
sight," and the court held that the statute did not "attach"
to such a bill
In my judgment the statute of 1857 does not attach to this
bill. It follows that it was not due until the 7th of January.
It was therefore delivered for protest upon the wrong day.
In such case I think the bank committed the error in delivering the bill on the wrong day for protest, and it is liable
therefore to the plaintiff. Am. Exp. Co., v.Haine, 1 Ind. 4.
The notary was directed by the bank to protest the bill. It
virtually decided that there was no grace thereon. The notary
is not presumed to be a jawyer who is to revise or reverse
the decision of his employer as to the character of the bill and
whether it is entitled to grace or not.
The bills and notes (fifty-two in all), delivered on this day to
the defendant as notary, were delivered for protest, not for advice from him as a lawyer. Doubtless the action of the bank
Imisled him.
If the bill was not .entitled to grace it was no doubt protested at the right time, as it is held that such bills are due
upon the day following, not the day preceding a public holiday. Salter v. Burs, 20 Wend. 205; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Cohn.
69.
There are other questions, but as these will dispose of the
case, it is not important to discuss them.
ALLEN, FOLGER and RAPALLO, J J., concurred. GROVER J

and

CHURCH, OH.

J., agreed as to the first ground.

Judgment reversed; new trial granted; costs to abide the
event.
When this case was tried, the defendant set up that lie was not liable, on
the ground that he was the agent only
of the Metropolitan Bank, and owed a
dutyto them alone; that he was under
no contract with and owed no duty to
the plaintif and was not responsible
to it for neglect to properly protest the

bill. In support of this he relied on
the rule, that a sub-agent is only responsibl el to the person from whom he
received his appointment; that he is
the agent of the agent and not the
agent of the principal.
Plaintiff's counsel conceded the gen.
eral rule to be as stated, but insisted
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that It had no application to the case
of a sub-agent who was a public officer,
whom the agent was compelled to employ; and that the rule only applied to
the cases of sub-agents, over whom
and whose appointment and removal
the agent had control
The court discussed the subject at
length and reviewed the cases of Allen
v. Merchants' .sank,33 Wend. 215;
finedes v. Bank of Utica, 20 rohns. 33
S.C. iCt, of Errors, 3 ('ow. (iJ; WilRon
r. Smith, 3 How. U. S. 734; Baker v.
Prenice, 6 AMass. 430; Bank of Metropolis
v. New England Bank, 1 How. U. S.
234; Lawrence v. ,ilonington .Bank, 6
Cow. 531; -ancy v. Weed, 3 Sandf. 384
Upon the review of all the cases the
court was of opinion that at common
law the notary in this case was not liable to the plaintiff, and that the dedecision in the Court of Errors in Allen
v. Merchant's Bank, 2 Wend. 215, was
conclusive against the plaintiff.
Thatcase was an action brought to recover damages, resulting from the ne.
glect of a notary, to whom a bank in
Philadelphlahaddeliveredanotetransmitted to It by the defendant for collection, to notify the indorsers, where
by the debt was lost. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant discharged its duty to the plaintiff when
it delivered the notes to its correspond.
ing bank In Philadelphia, and that the
notary and not the defendant was liable for neglect, 15 Wend. 5%3.The Court
of Errors reversed the judgment, holding that an agent receiving a note or
bill for collection is liable to the owner
for the laches of the agents employed
by it in effecting the collection or protest of the bill or note, and giving notice to the parties liable, in the event
of non-payment.
The court, however, was of opinion
that the defendant In this case was liable to plaintiff under the New York
statutes (3 R. S. 5 Ed. 474 § 37), by which

Vou. XX.-27.

it is provided that for any misconduct
In any of the cases where notaries pub.
lie appointed by the authority of the
State authorities to act, either by the
laws of this State, or any other State,
or country, by the laws of nptions or
commercial usage, they shall be liable
to the parties injured thereby for all
damages sustained. It willbe observed,
therefore, that as far as this case decides on the liability to the principal
of a sub-agent who is a public offlicer, it
is against the liability ofsuch sub-agent,
as the ground on which plaintiff had
judgment at the trial and the general
term was that defendant was liable
under the statutes.
As to the evidence offered on the
trial to prove a custom among notaries
in the city of New York, that presentment of bilisand notes was made by
their clerks, If It be conceded that at
common law the rule Is settled that a
notary must present in person the decision of the Court of Appeals does not
seem satisfactory.
In Edie v. East India Cbmpany,
Burr. 2116 (1716), evidence of a custom
among merchants, whereby when the
indorsement of a bill of exchanke
omitted the words "or order" the indorsement was held to be restrictive,
was rejected on the ground that the
contrary lad been held by the court,
and Lord 31AasFrELD said that the
question had been settled by the K. B.
and the Common Pleas, and therefore
witnesses ought not to be examined as
to the usage after such a solemn determination of what was the law. In
Allen v. Merchants' Bank, 15 Wend. 48,
Nm:sox J., says, that after a rule made
by.custom has b en recognized as law,
it Is no longer under the control of
mercantile usage, and the adjudication
is the proper evidence of it. It then
becomes fixed and unalterable, except
by legislative authority. In B-Inton v.
Locke, 5 Hill 437, BnONSON J., says that
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no usage or custom can be set up for
the purpose of controlling the rules of
law. To the same effect see Thompson
v. Ashton, 14 Johns 316; Bevine v. Dord,
5 N. Y. 95; Wheeler v. NewboZd, 15 N. Y.
393; Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Duguid v. Edwards, 50 Barb. 28.
As tohow well settledin NewYorkis
the rule at common law, that a notary
must personally present a bill which he
intends to protest, it was held in Onondaga Bank v. Bate, 3 Hill 53, that a ccrlffate of a notary that he caused a
note to be presented at maturity was
not sufficient evidence ofa demand, the
oourteonstirungthecertflcatetomean
that presentment had not been made
by the notary in person. And NW=SON,

J., declared his opinion that present
mentby a clerk was not authorized by
law. This decision was approved in
Hunt v.. Mabee, 7 N. York, 266. To the
same effect is Warnick v. Crane,4 Den.
460. These cases were decided undex
the statute of New York of 1853, which
made a notary's protest of an inland
bill evidence to the same extent as in
the case of a foreign bill. These cases
may not, therefore, be directly in point.
but it is to! be observed that the court,
in giving the opinion above, concede
the ground that at common law a notary must present in person, and there.
fore this point becomes immaterial as
upholding'the decision.
EL G. A.

Supreme Court of the United States.
SEMMFS, ADMINISTRATOR OF LUCKE,
CO. OF HARTFORD.

v. CITY FIRE INS

A policy of insurance provided that no suit or claim thereon should be sus.
tainable unless made within twelve months after the loss; and that in any such
suit commenced twelve months after the loss the lapse of time should be con.
elusive evidence against the validity of the claim. A loss occurred and the insured was prevented by the war from bringing suit within twelve months.
Held, that the war having rendered compliance impossible, the presumption
from the lapse of time was thereby destroyed and did not revive by the cessation of the war; and the insured might recover if his action was brought within
the period of the statute of limitations.
The period of the statute oflimitations is to be computed by excluding the
time of the war.
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Connecticut. The opinion of the Circuit Court
is reported 'in 8 Am. Law Reeg., N. S. 673.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER,

J.-This is an action on a policy of insurance, com-

menced on the 21st day of October, 1866, in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Connecticut, for a loss

which occurred on the 5th day of January, 1860.
The only plea of the defendant is that the action was not
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brought within twelve months after the loss occurred, as provided in one of the conditions of the policy.. To this plea
there are replications setting up, among other things, that the
late civil war prevented the bringing of the suit within the
twelve months provided in the condition, the plaintiff being
a resident and citiz.en of the State of Mississippi, and the defendant of Connecticut, during all that time.
There is in the record a paper purporting to be an opinion
of the court and a finding of the facts, by the court, which
finding is so mixed up with the argument of the court in sup.
port of its. decision that, under the construction so frequently given to the act of March 3,. 1865, the paper cannot
be treated as a part of the record, and can give us no aid in
deciding the case, except what may be derived from the able
argument of the learned judge who decided it below.
Fortunately, the pleadings themselves set up facts of which
thiA court can take, judicial notice sufficient to enable us to
decide on the allege4 error of the record, which isthat the
plea of defendant was held to present a good bar to the aetio)
notwithstanding the elrpct of the war on the rights of theparties.
The Circuit Court, in arriving at this conclusion, held, firs4
that the condition in the contract, limiting the time within
which suit could be brought, was like the statute of limitaticu susceptible of such enlargement in point of time, as was
necessary to accommodate, itself to the precise number 9f
days during- which the plaintiff was prevented from bringing
suit by the existence of the war. Ascertaining this by a reference to certain public acts of the political departments of the
Government, the court found that there was, between the
time at which it fixes the commencement of the war and the
date of plaintiffs loss, a certain number of days, which, added to the time between the close of the war and the commencement of the action, amounted to more than the twelve
months allowed by the condition of the contract.
It is not necessary, in the view which we take of the matter, to inquire whether the Circuit Court was correct in the
principle by which it fixed the date, either of the commencement or cessation of the disability to sue, growing out of the
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events of the war. For we are of opinion that the period of
twelve months which the contract allowed the plaintiff for
bringing his suit, does not open and expand itself so as to receive within it three or four years of legal disability created by
the war, and then close together at each end of that period so
as to complete itself, as though the war had never occurred.
It is true that, in regard to the limitation imposed by sta
tute, this court has held that the time may be so computed
but there the law imposes the limitation and the law imposes
the disability. It is nothing, therefore, but a necessary legal
logic that the one period should be taken from"the other. If
the law did not, by a necessary implication, take this time
out of that prescribed by the statute, one of two things would
happen; either the plaintiff would lose his right of suit by a
judicial construction of law which deprived him of the righf
to sue, yet permitted-the statute to run until it became a com
plete bar, or else, holding the statute under the circumstan
ces to be no bar, the defendant would be left, after the wai
was over, without the protection of any limitation whatever.
It was therefore necessary *to adopt the time provided by the
statute as limiting the right to sue, and deduct from that time
the period of disability.
, Such is not the case as regards this contract. Defendant
has made his own special and hard provisions on that subject.
It is not said as in a statute that plaintiff shall have twelve
months from the time his cause of action accrued to com.
mence suit, but twelve months from the time of loss; yet by
another condition the loss is not payable until six days after
it shall have been ascertained and proved. The condition is
that no suit or action shall be sustainable unless commenced
within the time of twelve months next after the loss shall
occur, and in case such action shall be commenced after the
expiration of twelve months, next after such loss, the lapse of
time shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against
the validity of the claim. Now, this contract relates to the
twelve months next succeeding the occurrence of the loss,
and the court has no right, as in the case of a statute, to construe it into a number of days equal to twelve months, to be
made up of the days in a period of five years in which plain-
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tiff could lawfully have commenced his suit. So also if the
plaintiff shows any reason which in law rebuts the presumption, which, on the failure to sue within twelve months is by
the contract made conclusive against the validity of the
claim, that presumptionis not revived again by the contract.
It would seem that when once rebutted fully nothing but a
presumption of law or presumption of fact could again revive
it. There is nothing in the contract which does it, and we
know of no such presumption of law. Nor does the same evil
consequence followfrom removing absolutely the bar of the
contract that would, from removing absolutely the bar of the
statute, for when the bar of the contract is removed there still
remains the bar of the statute, and though plaintiff may show
by his disability to sue a sufficient answer to th twelve
months provided by the contract, he must still bring his suit
within the reasonable time fixed by the legislative authority,
that is, by the statute of limitations.
We have no doubt that the disability to sue imposed on
plaintiff by the war relieves him from the consequences of
failure to bring suit within twelve months after the loss, be.
cause it rendered a compliance with that condition impossible, and removes the presumption which that contract says
shall be conclusive against the validity of the plaintiffs claim.
That part of the contract therefore presents no bar to plaintiff's right to recover.
As the Circuit Court founded its judgment on the proposition that it did, that judgment must be reversed, and the
case remanded for a new trial.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
'JOSEPH SYfONDS v. CHARLES F. BARNES.
In order to avoid a defendant's discharge under the United States Bankrupt
Act of 1867, on the ground that the schedule verified by oath did not contain a
statement of his debt to the plaintiff, and that the latter had no notice of the
proceedings In bankruptcy, and did not prove his claim, it must appear that the
omission was fraudulent and the affidavit willfully false.
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ON exceptions to the ruling of the Superior Court for Cum.
berland county.
Assumpsit on a promissory note, dated April 21, 1853,
given by the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant
pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy dated June 5, 1869.
The plaintiff ieplied that he ought not to be barred, because
that at the time of filing his petition in bankruptcy the de.
fendant's schedule of debts, annexed to his petition, or any
amendment thereto, did not contain a statement of the debt in
controversy, as required by § 11 of the United States Bankrupt Act; that the defendant at the time ' of filing his petition,
or at any time afterward, did not give to the Marshal of the
district, as messenger, the name of the plaintiff as one of the
defendant's creditors; that the Marshal did not serve written or
:printed notice by mail or personally upon the plaintiff; that
the plaintiff has never received notice of the pendency of the
proceedings in bankruptcy set forth in the plea; and that he
-never proved his said debt against the estate of the defendant
-inbankruptcy. To this replication there was a demurrer
and joinder.
The court sustained the demurrer and adjudged the replication bad, whereupon the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
Symonds & Libby, for plaintiff.
J. D. & F. Fessenden, for defendant.
APPLETON, C. J.-By the Bankrupt Act of 1841 the discharge of a bankrupt might be impeached for fraud in any
court in which it was pleaded in bar to a pending suit.
By the Bankrupt Act of 1867, § 34, it is enacted, "that a
discharge duly granted under this act shall release the bankrupt from all debts, claims, liabilities, and demands which
were or might have been proved against his estate in bank
ruptcy," unless his creditors should "see fit to contest the
validity of said discharge on the ground that it was fraudu
lently obtained." This must be done inthe court in whichit
was granted within two years, for some of the fraudulent acts of
omission or commission particularly set forth in Sect. 29. Such
was the construction given by this court to the act in Corey
v. Ri~pl, 57 Maine 69, and upon examining the debates when

SYMONDS V. BARNES.

the bill was under discussion, it will be seen that the effect there
given to the discharge, unless set aside and annulled by the
federal court granting it, was in strict conformity with the
intention of Congress.
The defendant pleads a discharge. It is in due. form of
law. "An order of discharge will be sufficient evidence of
bankruptcy and of the validity of the proceedings thereon."
Robson, Law of Bankruptcy, 458. The order proves itself 1
Deacon on Bankruptcy 800.
The plaintiff replies that his claim was omitted in the
schedule of debts sworn to by the defendants. If the bankrupt "has wilfully sworn falsely in his affidavit annexed to
his ..... .schedule or inventory," the court granting the
discharge may, upon proceedings duly bad before it, "set
aside and annul the same."
But the plea contains no allegations of fraudulent conduct
or willful false swearing. The court granting the discharge
,would not be authorized by the Act "to set aside or annul
the same." Much less would any other court.
Under the Act of 1841 it was held that a plaintiff could
not avoid a discharge of his bankrupt debtor by merely
showing that the defendant, in his petition in bankruptcy,
omitted to insert the plaintiff's name, etc., to the sworn list 6f
creditors, and that by reason of such omission the plaintiff
had no notice of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and could
neither prove his claims against the defendant nor oppose his
discharge. To avoid the discharge by reason of such omission, it must be shown to be willful and fraudulent. Burnside v. Bingham, 8 Met. 75; Mitchell v. Singletarg,19 Ohio
210.
The accidental omission of a creditor's name in the schedule of indebtedness is not made a ground for annulling and
setting aside a discharge. The omission, to have that effect,
must be fraudulent. The affidavit annexed to the schedule
must be willfully false. Indeed, the Act assumes that the
schedule of debts may not be complete, for by Sect. 11 the
marshal is directed to serve "written or printed notice, by
mail or personally, on all creditors upon the schedule filed
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with the debtor's petition, or whose names may be given to
him in addition by the debtor."
Exceptions overruled.
KENT, WALTON, BARROWS and DAxFOETH, JJ. concurred.
TAPLEY, J., concurred in the result.

United Statqs District Court. Districtof Minnesota.
THE UNITED STATES V. WELLS.1
The passing of counterfeit treasury notes maybe an offense against the United
States and also against an individual State.
In such case there would be concurrent jurisdiction in the Federal and State
courts to take cognizance of the offense, and the judgment of one would not be
pleadable, either in abatement or in bar of an indictment in the other.
But the rule of comity between courts of concurreptjurisdiction, that the one
acquiring jurisdiction of the case will not be interfered with during the
first
pendency of the proceedings, applies to criminal as well as civilactions.
Therefore, where a United States Marshal charged with the arrest of a coun.
terfeiter found him in the custody of a State sheriff on an indictment for the
same offense, his duty was to make return of that fact and leave the prisoner in
the sheriff's custody; but the marshal having taken the prisoner out of the
sheriff's hand, and the prisoner on indictment in the Federal Court having
pleaded the proceedings of the State Court in abatement, the Federal Court
sustained the indictment but remanded the prisoner to the custody of the
State authorities.

The prisoner was indicted at this term of the court for
passing counterfeit treasury notes. A plea in abatement was
interposed, alleging that an indictment had been found
against him at a regular term of the District Court of the
State of Minnesota, held in and for the county of Fillmore,
on the 16th day of May, 1871, charging him with the very
same crime of felony, as contrary to the statute and against
the peace and dignity of the State of Minnesota; that subsequently, on the 15th of November, 1871, the prisoner was
arrested by the sheriff on a bench warrant issued by the State
court, was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case was
continued until the next regular term of the court, and the
prisoner committed to the custody of the sheriff in default of
'For this case we are indebted to the .Ternal Revenue Reeord.-En.
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bail; that while the prisoner was held as aforesaid he was
taken out of the custody of the sheriff by the marshal of the
United States, and is now held by him without authority of
law.
A demurrer was filed by the United States.
C. K. Davis, U. S. District Attorney, for the United States.
Thomas Wilson, for defendant.
NELSON, J.-The question presented by the plea in abate-

ment is an interesting one, and although I am not able to give
it at this time the careful consideration which its importance
demands, I think I am safe in announcing the conclusions arrived at upon the examination of such authorities as have
been within my reach, at least, so far as to lay down a rule
of comity which must exist between the Federal and the State
courts in cases of this character, whether they arise in the
exercise of criminal or civil jurisdiction.
The point involved, though interesting, is not entirely a
new one. It has engaged the attention of both the State and
Federal courts, and the result in nearly every instance has
been to recognize the right of both courts to punish, in the
proper exercise of their authority, "when the same act (U.S.
v. Marigold, 9 Howard 570) might, as to its character and
tendencies, and the c6nsequences it involved, constitute an
offense against both the State and Federal governments." The
court, in this case, regarded this doctrine as distinctly enunciated in the case of Fox v. Ohio, 5 Howaid 410, and adopted
it as sound.
In the latter case, the point raised was whether the statute of the State of Ohio, which provided for the punishment
of passing counterfeit coin, was consistent with, or in contra.
vention of, the Constitution of the United States, or any law
enacted in pursuance of the Constitution.' After a full and
exhaustive argument the Supreme Court of the United States
decided, Mr. Justice McLEAN alone dissenting, that the State
possessed the power; but Mr. Justice DANIEL, who delivered

the opinion, said: "It is almost certain that in the benignant
spirit in which the institutions both of the State and Federal
systems are administered, an offender who should have suf-
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fered the penalties denounced by the one would not be subject, a second time, to punishment by the other, for acts essentially the same, unless public safety demanded it."
A very great variety of opinions existed previous to these
decisions, as is shown by the authorities cited by the learned
counsel for the defense.
My attention has been called to the case of Houston v.
.Afoore, 5 Wheaton 1, in which Judge WASHINIIGTON says:
"That if the jurisdiction be concurrent, the sentence of either
court, either of the conviction or acquittal, may be pleaded in
bar of the prosecution before the other." -The defendant's
counsel insists that by a parity of reasoning the plea in abatement must be held good in the case at bar, and the indictment dismissed, as it is undeniable that the State court first
obtained jurisdiction of the person of the offender. I feelthe
force of the reasons urged, hut cannot assent-to the opinion
above expressed.
Justice JOHNSON, who delivered a separate opinion in the
case, appears to have announced the doctrine which- has subsequently goerned the court in cases involving similar
questions of jurisdiction. He says: "Why maynot the same
offense be made punishable both under the laws of the State
and of the United States? Every citizen owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and participates in the government of both the State and the United States. . . .
When the United States has not assumed this exclusive exercise of power I cannot imagine a reason why the States may
not also, if they feel themselves injured by the same offense,
assert their right of inflicting punishment also." This opinion also dissents from the view maintained, that there might
be embarrassment in the general administration of justice,
and, I think, fairly indicates that rule of comity which should
control the courts.
Some able legal minds at that time, among the number
Chancellor KENT, took the same view of the case as did the
court in 5 Wheaton; others, Justices STORY and McLEAN,
have considered State laws similar to this one as repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States, and that they must
necessarily yield; if not, then delinquents or offenders are
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liable to be twice put in jeopardy and -be twice subjected to
,punishment, "against the manifest intent of the Act of Congress, the principles of the common -law, and' the genius of
our free government." They also deny that after the Federal
Congress have provided for the trial and punishment of an
offense manifestly within their constitutional authcoAty, a
State law, creating and defining a like offense, could confer
-jurisdiction upon a State -court to try it, without the consent
of Congress.
Others, not exactly concurring in the reasons announced
above, have doubted the authority of the State Governmens
,to enact any law which might make one act an offense against
-both governments. A very ingenious view is cited by JoY-Es,
-J.-in'the case of Jett 'v.Comnonwealth,1 Am. Law Reg. N.
S. 264. Speaking of the decisions upon the question that-a
-person could not by one act commit an offense against both
-the State and 'Federal Governments, he says: "An able
:'writer aaivocAted this-view, of the question, upon the ground
*that an offense against one State ought to be considered -is
merged in an offense aainst all the States."
Some State courts ad6pt d, at first, the -dissenting opinibn
6f Justice MCLEAN in Fox v.* Ohio, holding to the repugnancy

'ofthe State law to the Federal Constitution, and that the'e
would be double 'punishment for one offense. I have not.
time to allude to the views-taken by the courts in all of the
cases cited by counsel, but'they show conflict of opinion upon
the subject.
The principle involved again -came before the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Moore-v. People of
Illinois, 14 Howard 13. In this case the plaintiff had been
,convicted under a statute of Illinois for "harboring and" secreting a slave." It was strenuously urged that this law was
in conflict with the Constitution of the United States and the
Acts of Congress on the subject of fugitives from labor. I
will extract a portion of the opinion of the Court by Mr.
Justice GnIER, which sets at rest the point raised by the
,counsel in regard to the effect of a plea in bar: "It has been
urged that this Act is void, as it subjects the delinquent to a
double punishment for a single offense. . .
An offense,
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in its legal signification, means the trangression of a law. A
man may be compelled to make reparation in damages to the
injured party, and be liable also to punishment for a breach
of the public peace, in consequence of the same act; and may
be said, in common parlance, to be twice punished for the same
offense. Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen
of a State or Territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to
two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgiession of the laws of both. Thus, an assault
upon the marshal of the United States, and hindering him in
the execution of legal process, is a high offense against the
United States, for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment; and the same act may also be a gross breach of the
peace of the State, a riot, assault, or murder, and subject the
same person to punishment under the State laws for a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both may (if they see
fit), punish such an offinder, can not be doubted. Yet it can
not be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense ; but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable.
He could not plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other; consequently this court has decided in
the case of Fox v. f]ze State of Ohio, that a State court may
punish the offense of uttering and passing false coin as a cheat
or fraud practiced on its citizens, and in the case of the
United States v. Mfarigold, that Congress in the proper exercise of its authority may punish the same act as an offense
against the United States."
That distinguished jurist, the late Chief Justice TANEY,
subsequently gave his sanction to the decision in this case,
but he accompanied it with these remarks: "In all civilized
communities it is recognized as a fundamental principle of
justice that a man ought not to be punished twice for the
same offense." In the case before him he intimated that, if
the State court had inflicted punishment, he would have suspended sentence, to permit executive interference by pardon.
See opinion of RIVES, J., 18 Grattan 942.
These views, so manifestly humane, comnnd themselves
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to my sense of justice; but the concurrent jurisdiction must
be regarded as settled.
The State and Federal courts both having jurisdiction, the
question then naturally arises, how can a conflict be avoided ?
In the case before me, there was no process issued by this
court that could reach the person of the prisoner. U. S. v.
Van Forsen, 1 Dillon, Cir. Ct. Rep. 411 and note. The
marshal exceeded his authority in taking him from the custody of the sheriff. He should have made a return of the
fact, that the officer held the prisoner in custody for a violation of the State laws. Had this course been pursued, no apparent conflict would exist. The marshal having arrested the
prisoner and brought him before the court it is for me to
adopt a rule which suggests itself as sound, and which has
been distinctly announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States in several instances. Freeman v. Howe, 24
Howard 583; Buck v. C(obroth, 3 Wallace 334.
It is true these cases were not of a criminal nature, but I
can see no distinction in principle. The point to be considered was, how to avoid embarrassment by a conflict of jurisdiction between the two courts. The court in substance says
that the one which first has control of the subject matter shall
continue to exercise jurisdiction until judgment, without molestation or interference from the other.
This, it seems to me, is not only the prudent and wise
course to pursue in criminal as well as civil cases, but is due
to that common courtesy and comity which must exist between courts, and under a complex system like ours.
I shall sustain the indictment in this case, but believing*
that the State exercised jurisdiction in good faith, leave the
State court to deal with the offender. The federal authorities can take such steps as they may be advised in the future.
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Supreme Court of the Udited States.
JOHN WATSON ET. AL. V. WM. A. JONES ET AL.
Where the pendency of prior suit is set up to defeat another, the case must be
the same; there must be the same parties. orat ]east such as representthe same
interest; there must be the same rights asserted and the samerelief prayed for.
This relief must be founded on the same facts and the title or essential basis of

the relief must be the same.
Under these principles, held that this action was not the same as a previous

one relating to thesainesubject matter, and therefore this court hasjurisdiction
of this case. (CIFFORaD and DAVIS, JJ., dissenting].
The property which is the subject matter of dispute being inpossession of the
marshal of the Louisville Chancery Court as receiver, this court will not interfere with his possession, nor will it enjoin from receiving it parties to whom
the marshal is ordered by the Chancery Court to deliver it.
Where a subject matter of dispute is strictly and. purely ecclesiastical in its
character, matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline,
ecclesiastical government or the conformity of the members of the church to
the standard of moras required of them, the ecclesiastical tribunal is the judge
of its own jurisdiction, and its decisions upon that subject as wellason themel.
its of the case, are conclusive upon the civil courts.

The cases of ecclesiastical matters which come before civil courts classified
and discussed by MILLER, J.

Tms was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Kentucky. The facts appear in the
opinion of the court, which was delivered by
MILLER, J.-This case belongs to a class, happily rare in
our courts, in which one of the parties to a controversy, essen.
tially ecclesiastical, resorts to the judicial tribunals of the state
for the maintenance of rights which the church has refused
to acknowledge, or found itself unable to protect. Much as
such dissensions among the members of a religious society
should be regretted, a regret which is increased when passing
from the control of the judicial and legislative bodies of the
entire organization to which the society belongs, an appeal is
made to the secular authority; the courts when so called on
must perform their functions as in other cases.
Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude
as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable
purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are
equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of
their members subject to its restraints. Conscious as we may
be of the excited feeling engendered by this controversy, and
of the extent to which it has agitated the intelligent and pious
body of Christians in whose bosom it originated, we enter
upon its consideration with the satisfaction of knowing that
the principles on which we are to decide so much of it as is
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proper for our decision, are those applicable alike to all of
its class, and that our duty is the simple one of applying those
principles to the facts before us.
It is a bill in chancery in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Kentucky, brought by William A.
Jones, Mary J. Jones, and Ellenor Lee, citizens of Indiana,
against John Watson and others named, citizens of Kentucky,
and against the trustees of the Third or Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, in Louisville, a corporation created by an act
of the Legislature of that State. The trustees, McDougall,
McPherson, and Ashcraft, are also sued, as citizens of Kentucky. Plaintiffs allege in their bill that they are members
in good and regular standing of said church, attending its religious exercises under the pastorship of the Rev. John S.
Rays, and that the defendants, George Fulton and Henry Farley, who claim without right to be trustees of the church,
supported and recognized as such by the defendants, John
Watson and Joseph Gault, who also, without right, claim to
be ruling elders, are threatening, preparing and about to take.
unlawful possession of the house of worship and grounds'be..
longing to the church and to prevent Hays, who is the rightful pastor, from ministering therein, refusing to recognize him
as pastor and as ruling elder, Thomas J. Hackney, who, is
the sole lawful ruling elder; and that when they obtain such
possession they will oust said Hays and Hackney, and those
who attend their ministrations, among whom are complainants.
And they-further allege that Hackney, whose duty it is as.
elder, and McDougall, McPherson, and Ashcraft, whose duty
as trustees it is to protect the rights thus threatened, by such,
proceeding in the courts as will prevent the execution of the
threats and designs of the other defendants, refuse to take any
steps to that end.
They further allege that the Walnut Street Church, of
which they are members, now forms, and has ever since its
organization in the year 1842, formed. a part of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, known as the
Old School, which is governed by a written constitution that
includes the confession of faith, form of government, book of
discipline and directory for worship, and that the governing
bodies of the general church above the Walnut Street Church
are, in successive order, the Presbytery of Louisville, the
Synod of Kentucky and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. That while plaintifi and
about one hundred and fifteen members who worship with
them, and Mr. Hays, the paster, Hackney, the. ruling elder,
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and the trustees, McDougall, McPherson, and Ashoraft, are
now in full membership and relation with the lawful General
Presbyterian church aforesaid, the defendants named, with
about thirty persons formerly members of said church, worshiping under one Dr. Yandell as pastor, have seceded and
withdrawn themselves from said Walnut Street Church and
from the General Presbyterian Church of the United States,
and have voluntarily connected themselves with and are now
members of another religious society, and that they have repudiated and do now repudiate and renounce the authority
and jurisdiction of the various judicatories of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, and acknowledge and recognize the authority of other church judicatories which are disconnected from the Presbyterian Church of the United States
and from the Walnut Street Church. And they allege that
Watson and Gault have been, by order of the General Assembly of said church, dropped from the roll of elders in said
church for having so withdrawn and renounced its jurisdiction, and the assembly has declared the organization to which
plaintiffi adhere to be the true and only Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville.
They pray for an injunction and for general relief.
The defendants, Hackney, McDougall McPherson and Ashcraft answer, admitting the allegations of the bill, and that
though requested they had refused to prosecute legal proceedings in the matter.
The other defendants answer and deny almost every allegation of the bill. They claim to be the lawful officers of the
Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, and that they and those
whom they represent are the true members of the church.
They deny having withdrawn from the local or the general
church, and deny that the action of the general assembly cutting them off was within its constitutional authority. They
say
the toplaintiffs
are not,
and never have been, lawfully ad.
mitted
membership
in the
Walnut Street Church, and have
no such interest in it as will sustain this
suit, and they set up
and rely upon a suit still pending in the Chancery Court of
Louisville, which they say involves the same subject matter
and is between the same parties in interest as the Icsent
suit. They allcge that in that suit they have been decreed to
be the only true and lawful trustees and elders of the Walnut
Street Church, and an order has been made to place them in
possession of the church property, which order remains unexecuted, and the property is still in the possession of the
marshal of that court as its receiver. These facts are relied
on in bar to the present suit.
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This statement of the pleadings is indispensable to an understanding of the points arising in the case.. So far as an
examination of the evidence may be necessary it will be made,
as it is required in the consideration of those points.'
The first of these concerns the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court, which is denied; first, on the ground that plaintifl
have no such interest in the subject of litigation as will enable them to maintain the suit, and, secondly, on matters
arising out of the alleged proceedings in the suit in the Chancery Court of Louisville.
The allegation that plaintiffs are not lawful members of the.
Walnut Street Church is based iipon the assumption that their
admission as members was by a pastoi and elders who had
no lawful authority to act as such. As the claim of those
elders to be such is one of the matters which this bill is
brought to establish, and the denial of.which makes an issue
to be tried, it is obvious that the objection to the interest of
plaintifis must stand or fall with the decision on the merits,
and cannot b6 decided as a preliminary question. Their right
to have this question decided, if there is no other objection to
the jurisdiction, annot be doubted. Some attempt is made
in the answr to question the good faith of their citizenship "
but this seems to have been abandoned ini the argument.
In regard to the suit in the Chancery Court of Louisville,
which the defendants allege to be pending, there can be no
doubt but that court is one competent to entertain jurisdiction of all the matters set up in the present suit. As to those
matters, and to the parties, it is a court of concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court of the United States, and as between those codrts the rule is applicable that the one which
has first obtained jurisdiction in a given case must retain it
exclusively until it disposes of it by a final judgment or
decree.
But when the pendency of such a suit is set up to defeat
another, tb case must be the same. There must be the same
parties, or at least such as represent the same interest, there
must be the same rights asserted, and the same relief prayed
for. This relief must be founded on the same facts, and the
title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same.
The identity in these particulars should be such that, if the
pending case iad already been disposed of, it could be pleaded
in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between
the same parties.
In the case of Barrows v. Kindred,4 Wallace 397, -which.
was an action of ejectment, the plaintiffshowed a good title to
the land, and defendant relied on a former judgment in his
VOL. XX,-28
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favor, between the same parties for the same land, the statute
of Illinois making a judgment in such an action as conclusive
as in other personal actions, except by way of a new trialBut this court held that, as in the second suit plaintiff introduced and relied upon a new and different title, acquired since
the first trial, that judgment could be 'no bar, because that
title had not been passed upon by the court in the first suit.
But the principles which should govern in regard to the
identity of the matters in issue in the two suits to make the
pendency of the one defeat the other, are as fully discussed in
the case of Buck v. Uolbatli, 3 Wallace 334, where that was
the main question, as in any case we have been able to
find. It was an action of trespass, brought in a State court,
against the marshal of the Circuit Court of the United States
for seizing property of plaintiff; under a writ of attachment
from the Circuit Court. And it was brought while the suit
in the Federal Court was still pending, and while the marshal
held the property subject to its judgment. So far as the ls
pendens and possession of the property in one court, and a suit
brought for the taking by its officer in another, the analogy
to the present case is very strong. In that case the court said:
"It is not true that a court, having obtained jurisdiction of a
subject matter of suit, and of parties before it, thereby excludes all other courts from the right to adjudicate upon other
matters having a very close connection with those before the
first court, and in some instances requiring the decision of the
same question exactly. In examining into the exclusive character of the jurisdiction in such cases, we must have regard
to the nature of the remedies, the character of the relief
sought, and the identity of the parties in the different suits."
And it might -have been added, to the facts on which the claim
for relief is founded.
"A party," say. the court by way of example, "having
notes secured by a mortgage on real estate, may, unless restrained by statute, sue in a court of cianeery to foreclose his
mortgage, and in a court of law to recover a judgment on his
note, and in another court of law in an action of ejectment for
possession of the land. Here, in all the suits, the only question at issue may be the existence of the debt secured by the
mortgage. But, as the relief sought is different, and the mode
of proceeding diffbrent, the jurisdiction of neither court is affected by the proceedings in the other." This opinion contains
a critical review of the cases in this court of Hagan v. Lucas,
10 Peters 402; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 624; Taylor y. Carryl, 20 How. 594; and Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, cited
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and relied on by counsel for appellants; and we are satisfied
it states the doctrine correctly.
The limits which necessity assigns to thi opinion forbids
our giving, at length, the pleadings in the case in the Louisville Chancery Court. But we cannot better state what is,
and what is not, the subject matter of that suit or controversy,
as there presented and as shown throughout its course, than b;y
adopting the language of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
in its opinion delivered at the decision of that suit, in favor of
the present appellants. "As suggested in argument," says
the court, "and apparently conceded on both sides, this is not
a case of division or schism in a church; nor is there any
question as to which of the two bodies should be recognized
as the Third or Walnut Street Presbyterian Church. Neither
is there any contr6versy as to the authority of Watson and
Gault, to act as ruling elders; but the sole inquiry to which
we are restricted in ogr opinion, is whether Avery, McNaugh.
tan andaLeech are also ruling elders, and therefore'members
of the session of the church."
The summary which we have already given of the pleadings in the present suit shows conclusively a diftrent state of
facts, different issues, and a different relief sought: This is a
case of a division or schism in the church. It is a question
as to which of two bodies shall be recogniud as the Third or
Walnut Street Presbyterian Church. There is a controversy
as to the authority of Watson and Gault to act as ruling elders,
that authority being denied in the bill of complainants, and,
so far from the claim of Avery, McNaughtan and Leech to be
ruling elders being the sole inquiry in this case, it is a very
subordinate iiatter, and it depends upon facts and circumstances altogether different from those set up and relied on in
the other suit, and which did not exist when it was brought.
The issue here is no longer a mere question of eldership, but
it is a separation of the original church members and officers,
into two distinct bodies, with distinct members and officers,
each claiming to be the true Walnut Street Presbyterian
Church, and denying the right of the other to any such claim.
This brief statement of the issues in th6 two suits leaves no
room for argument to show that the pendency of the first can
not be pleaded either in bar or in abatement of the second.
The supplemental. petition filed by plaintiff§ in that case,
after the decree of the Chancery Court had been reversed on
appeal, and which did contain very much the same matter
found in the present bill, was, on motion of plaintiffs' counsel,
and, by order of the court, dismissed, without prejudice, be-
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fore this suit was brought, and, of course, was not a Us pen.
dens at that time.
It is contended, however, that the delivery to the trustees
and elders of the body of which plaintiffs are members, of the
possession of the church building, can not be granted in this
suit, nor can the defendants be enjoined from taking possession as prayed in the bill, because the property is in the actuial possession of the marshal of the Louisville Chancery
Qourt as its receiver, and because there is an unexecuted decree of that court ordering the marshal to deliver the possession to defendants.
In this the counsel for appellants are, in our opinion, sus.
tained, both by the law and by the state of the record of the
suit in that court.
The court, in the progress of that suit, made several orders
concerning the use of the church, and finally placed it in the
possession of the marshal as a receiver, and there is no ordei
scharging his receivership; nor does it seem to ais that
there is any valid order finally disposing of the case, so that
it can be said to be no longer in that court. For, though the
Chancery Court did, on the 20th March, 1867, after the re.
versal of the case in the Court of Appeals, enfer an order reversing its former decree and dismissing the bill, with costs,
in favor of the defendants, the latter, on application to thL
Appellate Court, obtained another order dated June 26. By
this order, or mandate to the Chancery Court, it was directed
to render a judgmcnt in conformity to the opinion and man.
date of the court, restoring possession, use and control of the
church property to the parties entitled thereto, according to
said opinion, and so far as they were deprived thereof by the
marshal of the Chancery Court under its order.
In obedience to this mandate the Chancery Court, on the
18th September, three months after the commencement of
this suit, made an order that the marshal restore the posses.
sion, use and control of the church building to Henry Farley,
George Fulton, B. F. Avery, or a majority of them, as trustees, and to John Watson, Joseph Gault and Thos. J. Hackney, or a majority of them, as ruling elders, and to report how
he had executed the order, and reserving the case for such
further order as might be necessary to enforce full obedience.
It is argued here by counsel for appellees that the case was,
in effect, disposed of by the orders of the Chancery Court, and
nothing remained to be done which could have any practical
operation on the rights of the parties.
But if the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decree of the
chancellor in favor of plaintiffs, was of opinion that defend
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ants should be restored to the position they occupied in regard to the possession and control of the property before that
suit began, we have no doubt of their right'to make such order as was necessary to effect that object; and, as the proper
mode of doing this was by directing the chancellor to make
the necessary order and have it enforced as chancery decrees
are enforced in his Court, we are of opinion that the order
of the Court of Appeals, above recite , was in essence and
effect a decree in that cause for such restoration, and
that the last order of the Chancery Court, made in accordance with it, is a valid subsisting decree, which, though
final, is unexecuted.
The decisions of this court in the cases of Taylor v. Carryl,
20 How. 594, and Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, and Burk
'v. Colbath, 5 Wallace, are conclusive that the marshal of the
Chancery Court cannot be displaced as to the mere actual
possession of the property, because that might lead to a personal conflict- between the officers of the two courts for that
ossession. And the Act of Congress of March 2, .1793, 1 U.
. Statutes 334, § 5, as construed inthe cases of Diggs v. WfaZcott, 4 Cranch 192, and Pec7 v. Jenness,7 How. 625, are equally conclusive against .any injunction from the Circuit Court,
forbiddingthe defendants to take the possession which the unexecuted decree of the Chancery Court requires the marshal to
deliver to them.
But, though the prayer of the bill in this suit does ask for
an injunction to restrain Watson, Gault, Fulton and Farley
from taking possession, it also prays such other and further
relief as the nature of the case requires, and especially thait
said defendaiits be restrained from interfering with Hays, as
pastor, and plaintiffs in worshiping in said church. Under
this prayer for general relief, if there was any decree which
the Circuit Court could render for the protection of the right
of plaintiffs, and which did not enjoin the defendants from
taking possession of the church property, and which did not
disturb the possession of the marshal of the Louisville Chancery, that court had a right to hear the case and grant that
relief. This leads us to inquire what is the nature and character of the possession to which those parties are to be restored.
One or two propositions which seem to admit of no controversy are proper to be noticed in this connection. 1. Both by
the Act of the Kentucky Legislature creating the trustees of
the church a body corporate, and by the acknowledged rules
of the Presbyterian Church, the trustees were the mere nominal title holders and custodians of the chin ch property, and
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other trustees were, or could be elected by the congregation,
to supply their places once in every two years. 2. That in
the use of the property for all religious services or ecclesiastical )urposes, the trustees were under the control of the church
session. 3. That by the constitution of all Presbyterian
churches, the session, which is the governing body in each, is
composed of the ruling elders and pastor, and in all business
of the session the majority of its members govern, the number of elders for each congregation being variable.
The trustees obviously hold possession for the use of the
persons who, by the constitution, usages and laws of the Presbyterian body, are entitled to that use. They are liable to removal by the congregation for whom they hold this trust, and
others may be substituted in their places. They have no personal ownership or right beyond this, and are subject in their
official relations to the property to the control of the session
of the church.
The possession of the elders, though accompanied with
larger and more efficient powers of control, is still a fiduciary
possession. It is as a session of the church alone that they
could exercise power. Except by an order of the session in
regular meeting they have no right to make any order concerning the use of the building; and any action of the session
is necessarily in the character of representatives of the church
body by whose members it was elected.
If then this true body of the church, the members of thai
conregation, having rights of user in the building, have. in a
mode which is authorized by the canons of the general church
in this country, elected and installed other elders, it does not
seem to us inconsistent or at variance with the nature of the
possession which we have described, and which the Chancery
Court orders to be restored to the defendants, that they should
be compelled to recognize these rights, and permit those who
are the real beneficiaries of the trust held by them to enjoy
the uses, to protect which that trust was created. Undoubtedly, if the order of the Chancery Court had been executed,
and the marshal had delivered the key of the church to defendants, and placed them in the same position they ivere before that suit was commenced, they could in any court having
jurisdiction, and in a case properly made out, be compelled to
respiect the rights we have stated, and be controlled in the use
of the possession by the court so far as to secure those rights.
All that we have said in regard to the possession which the
marshal is directed to deliver to defendants is equally applicable to the possession held by him pending the execution of
that order. His possession is a substitute for theirs, and the
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order under which he received that possession, which we have
recited, shows this very clearly.
The decree which we are now reviewing seems to us to be
carefully framed on this view of the matter. While the
rights of plaintifls and those whom they sue for are admitted
and established, the defendants are still recognized as entitled
to the possession which we have described; and while they
are not enjoined from receiving that possession from the Marshal, and he is not restrained from obeying the Chancery
Court by delivering it, and while there is no order made on
the marshal at all to interfere with his possession, the defendants are required by the decree to respect the rights of plain.
tiffs, and to so use the possession and. control to which they
may be restored as not to hinder or obstruct the true uses 9f
the trust which that possession is intended to protect.
We are next to inquire whether the decree thus rendered
is based upon an equally just view of the law as applied to
the facts- of this controversy. These, though making up i
copious record of matter by no means pleasant reading to th&
sincere and thoughtful Christian philanthropist, may be stated
with a resonable brevity so far as they bear upon the princi-.
pies which must decide the case.
From the commencement of the late war of the insurrection
to its close, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
at its annual meetings expressed in declaratory statements or
resolutions its sense of the obligation of all good citizens to
support the Federal Government in that struggle, and when,
by the proclamation of President Lincoln, emancipation of the
slaves of the States in insurrection was announced, that body also
expressed views favorable to emancipation, and adverse to the
institution of slavery. And at its meeting in Pittsburg in May,
1865, instructions were given to the presbyteries, the board
of missions, and to the sessions of the churches, that when any
persons from the Southern States should make application for
employment as missionaries or for admission as members, or
ministers of churches, inquiry should be made as to their
sentiments in regard to loyalty to the government and on the
subject of slavery; and if it was found that they .had been
guilty of voluntarily aiding the war of the rebellion, or held
the doctrine announced by the large body.of the churches in
the insurrectionary States which had organized a new General
Assembly, that "the system of negro slavery in the South is
a divine institution, and that it is the peculiar mission of the
Southern Church to conserve that institution," they should be
required to repent and forsake these sins before they could be
received.
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In the month of September thereafter the Presbytery of
Louisville, under whose immediate jurisdiction was the Walnut Street Church, adopted and published in pamphlet form
what is called a "Declaration and testimony against the erroneous and heretical doctrines and practices which have obtained
and been propagated in the Presbyterian Church of the United
States during the last five years." This declaration denounced in the severest terms the action of the General Assembly in
the matters we have just mentioned, declared their intention
to refuse to be governed by that action, and invited the cooperation of all .members of the Presbyterian. Church who
shared the sentiments of the declaration in a concerted resistance to what they called the usurpation of authority by the
assembly.
It is useless to pursue the history of this controversy further
with minuteness.
The General Assembly of 1866 denounced the declaration
and testimony, and declared that every presbytery which refused to obey its order should be ipso facto dissolved, and
called to answer before the next general assembly, giving the
Louisville Presbytery an opportunity for repentance and conformity. The Louisville Presbytery divided, and the adherents of the declaration and testimony sought and obtained admission, in 1868, into "the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States," of which we have already spoken as having
several years previously withdrawn from the General Assembly of the United States and set up a new organization.
We cannot better state the results of these procecings upon
the relations of the church organizations and members, to each
other and to this controversy, than in the language of the
brief of appellants' counsel in this court:
In January, 1866, the congregation of the Walnut Street
Church became divided in the manner stated above, each
claiming to constitute the church, although the issue as to
membership was not distinctly made in the chancery suit of
Avery v. M~atson. Both parties at this time recognized the
same superior church judicatories.
On the 19th of June, 1866, the Synod of Kentucky became
divided, the opposing parties in each claiming to constitute
respectively the true presbytery and the true synod; each
meanwhile recognizing and claiming to adhere to the same
General Assembly. Of these contesting bodies the appellants
adhered to one; the appellees to the other.
On the 1st of June, 1867, the prcsbytery and synod recognized by the appellants were declared by the General Assembly
to be "in no sense a true and lawful syiod and presbytery in
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connection with and under the care and authority of theGeneral Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America," and were permanently excluded- from connection with or representation in the assembly; by the same
resolution the synod and presbytery adhered to by appellees
were declared to be the true and lawful Presbytery of Louisville and Synod of Kentucky.
The Synod of Kentucky thus excluded, by a resolution
adopted the 28th of June, 1867, declared "that in its future
action it will be governed by this recognized sundering of all
its relations to the aforesaid revolutionary body (the General
Assembly) by the acts of that body itself." The presbytery
took substantially the same action.
In this final severance of presbytery and synod from the
General Assembly, the appellants and'appellees continued to
adhere to those bodies at first recognized by them respectively.
In the earliest stages of this controversy it was found that
a majority, of the members of the Walnut Street Church 'corieurred with the action of the General Assembly, while Watson
a-ad Gault as ruling elders, and Fulton and Farley as trustees,
constituting in each case a majority of the session and of the
ti ustees, with Mr. McElroy, the pastor, sympathized with the
,party of the declaration and testimony of the Louisville
P bytery. This led to eflbrts by each party to exclude the other from participation in the session of the church.
and the use of the property. This condition of affairs being
brought before the Synod of Kentucky before any separation,
that body appointed a commission to hold an election by the
members of the Walnut Street Church of three additional
ruling elders. .Watson and Gault refused to open the church
for the meeting to hold this election, but the majority of the
members of the congregation, meeting on the sidewalk in
front of the church, organized and elected Avery, Leech and
McNaughton, additional ruling elders, who, if lawful elders,
constituted with Mr. Hackney a majority of the session. Gault
and Watson, Farley and Fulton refused to recognize them as
such, and hence the suit in the Chancery Court of Louisville,
which turned exclusively on that question..
The newly-elected elders and the majority of the congregation have adhered to and been recognized by the General Assembly as the regular and lawful Walnut Street Church and
officers, and Gault and Watson, Fulton and Farley, and a
minority of the members, have cast their fortunes with those
who adhered to the declaration and testimony party.
The divipion and separation finally extended to the Presby.
tei y of Louisville and the Synod of Kentucky. It is now com.
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plete and apparently irreconcilable, and we are called upon to
declare the beneficial uses of the church property in this condition of total separation between the members of what was
once a united and harmonious congregation of the Presbyan Church.
The questions which have come before the civil courts concerning the rights to property held by ecclesiastical bodies
may, so far as we have been able to examine them, be profitably classified under three general heads, which, of course,
do not include cases governed by considerations applicable to
a church established and supported by law as the religion of
the State.
1. The first of these is when the property which is the subject of controversy has been, by the deed or will of the donor,
or other instrument by which the property is held, by the express terms of the instrument devoted to the teaching, support, or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or
belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious
congregation, which, by the nature of its organization, is
strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so
far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.
3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are
superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate
power of control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.
In regard to the first of these classes it seems hardly to
admit of a rational doubt that an individual or an association
of individuals may dedicate property by way of trust to the
purpose of sustaining, supporting and propagating definite religi'ous doctrines or principles, 1)rovided that in doing so they
violate no law of morality, and give to the instrument by
which their purpose is evinced the formalities which the laws
require. And it would seem also to be the obvious duty of
the court, in a case properly made, to see that the property so
dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached
to its use. So long as there are persons qualified within the
meaning of the original dedication, and who are also willing
to teach the doctrines or principles prescribed in the Act of
dedication, and so long as there is anyone so interested in the
execution of the trust as to have a standing in court, it must
be that they can prevent the diversion of the property or fund
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to other and different uses. This is the general doctrine of
courts of.equity as to charities, and it seems equally applicable to ecclesiastical matters.
In such case, if the trust is confided to a religious congregation of the independent or congregational form of church
government, it is not in the power of the majority of that
congregation, however preponderant, by reason of a change
of views on religious subjects, to carry the property so confided to them to the support of new awl iunficting doctrine. A pious man building and dedicating a house of
worship to the sole and exclusive iqse of those who be.
"lieve in the do~trine of the Holy Trinity, and placing it under the control of a congregation which 6at the time holds the
same belief, has a right to expect that.the law will preven;
that property from being usedas a means of support and dis.
semination of the Unitarian doctrine, and as a place of Unitarian Worship. Nor is the principle varied when the organition to which the trust is confided is of the second or associated form of church government. -The protection which the
law throws around the trust is the same.
And though the task may be a delicate one and a difficult
one, it will be the duty of the court in such cases, when the
doctrine to be taught or the form of worship to be used is
definitely and clearly laid down, to inquire whether the party
accused of violating the trust is holding or teaching a different
doctrine, or using a form of worship which is so far variant as
to defeat the declared objects of'the trust. In the leading case
on this.subject in the English courts, of the Attorney- General
v. Par'son,3 Merrivale 353, Lord ELDON said, I agree with
the defendants that the religious belief of the parties is irrelevant to the matters in dispute, except so far as the ing's
Court is called upon to execute the trust. That was a case in
which the trust deed declared the house which was erected
under it was for the worship and service of God. And though
we may not be satisfied with the very artificial and elaborate
argument by which the chancellor arrives at the conclusion,
that because any other view of the nature of the Godhead than
the Trinitarian view was heresy by the laws of England, and
any one giving expression to the Unitarian view was liable to
be severely punished for heresy by the secular courts, at the
time the. deed was made, that the trust was, therefore, for
Trinitarian worship, we may still accept the statement that
the court has the right to enforce a trust clearly defined on
such a subject.
The case of .Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492, appears to have
been decided in the Court of Errors of New York on this
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principle, so far as any ground of decision can be gathered
from the opinions of the majority of the court as reported.
The second class of cases which we have described has reference to the case of a church of a strictly congregational or
independent organization, governed solely within itself, either
by a majority of its members or by such local organism as it
may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government; and to property held by such a church, either by way
of purchase or donation, with no other specific trust attached
to it in the hands of the church than that it is for the use of
that congregation as a religious society.
In such cases where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such
bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the
ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If
the principle of government in such cases is that the
majority rules, then the numerical majority of members
must control the right to the use of the property. . If
there be within the congregation officers in whom are
vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere to
the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed
are entitled to the use of the property.
The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the
governing body, can claim no rights in the property from the
fact that they had once been members of the church or congregation.
This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious
opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organization, for, if such was permitted, a very small minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found to
be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of the
founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed
upon the property when purchased or given, the court will
not imply one for the purpose of expelling from its use those
who by regular succession and order constitute the church,
because they may have changed in some respect their views
of religious truth.
Of the cases in which this doctrine is applied no better representative can be found than that of Shannon v. Frost,8 B.
Monro 253, where the principle is ably supported by the
learned Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
The case of Snith v. Velson, 18 Verm. 511, asserts this
doctrine in a case where a legacy was left to the Associate
Congregation of Ryegate, the interest whereof was to be annually paid to their minister forever. In that case, though
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the Ryegate congregation was one of a number of Presbyterian churches connected with the general Presbyterian body
at large, the court held that the only inquiry was whether the
society still exists, and whether they have a minister chosen
and appointed eby the majority, and regularly oidained over
the society, agreeably to the usage of that denomination.
And though we may be of opinion that the doctrine of that
case needs modificition, so far as it discusses the relation of
the Ryegate congregation to the other judicatories of the body
to which it belongs, it certainly lays down the principle correctly if that congregation was to be treated as an independent
one.
But the third of these classes of cases .is the one which is
oftenest found in the courts, and which, with reference to the
number and difficulty of the questions involved, and to other
considerations, is every way the most important.
It is the case of property acquired in any of the usual modes
for the general use of a religious congregation, which is itself
part of a large and general organization of some religious denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected
by religious views and ecclesiastical government.
-The case before us is one of this class, growing out of a
schism which has divided the congregation and its officers,
and the presbytery and synod, and which appeals to the
courts to determine ihe right to the use of the property so acquired. Here is no case of property devoted forever by the
instrument which conveyed it, or by any specific declaration
of its owner, to the support of any special religious dognas,
or any peculiar form of worship, but of property purchased
for the use of a religious congregation, and so long as any existing religious congregation can be ascertained to be that
congregation, or its regular and legitimate successor, it is entitled to the use of the property. In the case of an independent congregation we have pointed out how this identity or
'succession, is to be ascertained, but in cases of this character
we are bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is
itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control,
and is bound by its orders and judgments. There are in the
Presbyterian system of ecclesiastical government in )e lar
succession, the presbytery over the session or local chuich,
the synod over the presbyte-ry, and the General Assembly over
all. These are called, in the language of the church organs,
judicatories, and they entertain appeals from the decision oL
those below and prescribe corrective measures in other cases.
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which
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should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound
view of the relations of church and state under our system of
laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial
authority is that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law, have
a been decided
by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application
to the case before them.
We concede at the outset that the :doctrine of the English
courts is otherwise. In the case of the Attorney General v.
Pearson, cited" before, the proposition is laid down by Lord
ELDON', and sustained by the peers, that it is the duty of the
court in such cases to inquire and decide for itself, not only
what was the nature and power of these church judicatories,
but what is the true standard of faith in the church organization, and which of the contending parties before the court
holds to this standard. And in the subsequent case of Craigdallie v. Aikman, 2 Bligh 529, the same learned judge expresses in strong terms his chagrin that the Court of Sessions
of Scotland, from which the case had been appealed, had failed
to find on this latter subject, so that he could rest the case on
religious belief but had declared that in this matter there was
no difference between thie parties.
And we can very well understand how the Lord Chancellor
of England, who is, in his office, in a large sense, the head and
representative of the Established Church, who controls very
largely the church patronage, and whose judicial decision may
be, and not unfrequently is, invoked in cases of heresy and
ecclesiastical contumacy, should feel, even in dealing with a
dissenting church, but little delicacy in grappling with the most
abstruse problems of theological controversy, or in construing
the instruments which those churches have adopted as their
rules of government, or inquiring into their customs and usages.
The dissenting church in England is not a free church in the
sense in which we apply the term in this country, and it was
much less free in Lord ELDON'S time than now. Laws then
existed upon the statute book hampering the free exercise of
religious belief and worship in many most oppressive forms,
and though Protestant dissenters were le~s burdened than Catholics and Jews, there (lid not exist that full, entire and practical freedom for all forms of religious belief and practice which
lies at the foundation of our political principles, and it is quite
obvious, from an examination of the series of cases growing out
of the organization of the Free Church of Scotland, found in
Shaw's Reports of Cases in the Court of Sessions, that it was
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only under the pressure of Lord ELDON'S ruling established in
the House of Lords, to which final appeal lay in such cases,
that the doctrine was established in the Court of Sessions after
no little struggle and resistance.
The full history of the case of Craigdalliev. Aikman, in the
Scottish Court, which we cannot further pursue, and the able
opinion of Lord MEADOWBANK in Galbraithv. Smidth 1 ! .aw
808, show this conclusively.
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality
and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is
conceded to all. The law knows no heresy and is committed
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.
The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted
questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical
government of all the individual members', congregations and
officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All
who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied
consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.
But it would be a vain consent and would lead to thetotal sub
version of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one
of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have
them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions,
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of
uestions arising among themselves, that those decisions should
e binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizancei subject only
to such appeals.as the organism itself provides for.
Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted
by submitting those decisions to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large and influential bodies (to
mention no others, let reference be had tr 1, Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, andthe i , syterian Chui.hes)
has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of itt own,
to be found in their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in their usage and
customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical
law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become
familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of the
civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and
religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are
in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal
from the more learned tribunal in the law which should? decide the case to one which is less so.

WATSON v. JONES.

We have said that these views are supported by the preponderant weight of authority in this country, and for the
reasons which we have given, we do not think the doctrines
of the English Chancery Court on this subject should have
with us the influence which we would cheerfidlly accord to it
on others.
We have already cited the case of qhanncn v. Frost, 3 B.
Monroe, in which the appellate court of the Stake where this controversv originated, sustains the proposition uflearly and fully.
"This court," says the Chief Justice, "having no ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, cannot revise or question ordinary acts of church
discipline. Our only judicial power in the case arises from the
conflicting claims of the church property and the use of it. We
cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor
whether the excommunicated have beenjustly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly, cut off from the body of the church."
In the subsequent case of Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. Monroe
481, which arose out of the general division of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, we understand the same principles to be laid
down as governing that case, and in the case of Watson v.'Avery.
2 Bush 332, the case relied on by appellants as a bar, and considered in the former part of this opinion, the doctrine of Shan.
non v. Frost is in general terms conceded, while a distinction is
attempted which we will consider hereafter.
One of the most careful and well considered judgments on
the subject is that of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina,
delivered by Chancellor JOHNSON in the case of Harmon v.
.Dreher,2 Speer's Eq. 87. The case turned upon certain rights
in the use of the church property claimed by the minister, notwithstanding his expulsion from the synod as one of its members.
"le stands," says the chancellor "convictel of the offenses
alleged against him, by the sentence of Ithe spiritual body of
which he was a voluntary member, and 'whose proceedings he
had bound himself to abide. It belongs not to the civil power to
enter into or review the proceedings of a spirtual court., The
structure of our government has for the preservation of civil
liberty rescued the temporal institutions from religious interfercnce. On the other haad it has secured religious libty
from theinvasion of civil authority. Thejudgncnts, thar"I' .e,
of religious associations, bearing on their own members, a.' not
examinable here, and I am not to in-uire whether the do,.' -,0,es
attributed to Mr. Dreher were held by him, or whether if, -1d
were anti-Lutheran; or whednl-r his conduct was or was not'i .iccordance with the duty he owe I to the Synod orto his deno.);ria.
*
*
*
When a civil right depends upoil aa
tion.
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ecclesiastical matter it is the civil court and not the ecclesiastical which is to decide. But the civil tribunal tries the civil.
right, and no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out oi
which the civil right arises, as it finds them." The principle
is reaffirmed by the same court in the John's Island Church
case, 2 Richardson Eq. 215.
In Den v. Bolton, 7 Halstead 206, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey asserts the same principles, and though founding its de4ision mainly on a statute, it is said to be true on general principles.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Ferrariav. Trau.
cancelles, 25 Ill., 456, refers to the case of Shannon v. Frost, 3
B. Monroe, with approval, and adopts the language of the court
that "the judicial eye cannot penetrate thb veil of the church
for the forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of
excised members; when they became members theydid so upon
the condition of continuing or not as they and their churches
'might determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical
power and cannot now invoke the supervisory power of the
civil tribunals."
In the Very important case of Chase v. Cheney, recently decided in the same court, 10 Am. L. R. N. S, 295, Judge LAwRENCE, who dissented, says he understands the opinion as implying that in the administration of ecclesiastical discipline,
the
and clerical
where no
other
right inciient
of property is involved than loss of
office
or salary
to such discipline, a spiritual
decision
ofexclusive
that question
on the secular
courts.
court is the
judge is
of binding
its own jurisdiction,
and that
its

And he dissents with Judge SHE.LDONr from the opinion because
it socase
holdt.
In the
of Yatson v. Ferris,45 Missouri 183, which was
a case growing out of the schism in the Presbyterian Church
in Missouri in regard to this same declaration and testimony
and the action of the General Assembly, the court held that
whe he dss
ase was reglarly or irregularly before the
assembly was a question which the assembly had a right to

determine for itself, and no civil court could reverse, modify,
or impair its action ina matter of merely ecclesiastical concern.
We cannot better close this review of the authorities than
in the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Ihe
case of the Werman Reformed Church v. Siebert, 5 Barr 291 :
"The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial tribunal, are final, as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offense against the word of God and the discipline
of the church. Any other than those courts must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline and doctrine; and
VoL. XX.-29
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civil courts if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their
jurisdiction, would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do anything but improve either
religion or good morals."
In the subsequent case of Me Ginni's v. Watson, 41 Penn.
21, this principle is again supplied and supported by a more
elaborate argument.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Watson
v. Avery, before referred to, while admitting the general principle here laid down, maintains that when a decision of an ecclesiastical tribunal is set up in the civil courts, it is always open
to inquiry whether the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction,
and if it did not, its decision would not be conclusive.
There is, perhaps, no word in legal terminology so frequently
used as the word jurisdiction, so capable of use in a general
and vague sense, and which is used so often by men learned
in the law without a due regard to precision in its application.
As regards its use in the matters we have been discussing it
may very well be conceded that if the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church should undertake to try one of its members for murder, and punish him with death or imprisonment,
its sentence would be of no validity in a civil court or anywhere else. Or if it should at the instance of one of its members entertain jurisdiction as between him and another member as to their individual right to property, real or personal,
the right in no sense depending.on ecclesiastical questions, its
decision would be utterly disregarded by any civil court where
it might be set up. And it might be said in a certain general
sense very justly, that it wasbecause the General Assembly had
no jurisdiction of the ease. Illustrations of this character could
be multiplied in which the proposition of the Kentucky court
- ould be strictly applicable.
But it is a very different thing where a subject matter of
dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character-a
matter over which the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction-a
matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the mem.
bers of the church to the standard of morals required of them,
becomes the subject of its action. It may be said here, also,
that no jurisdiction has"been conferred on the tribunal to try
the particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the
church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding
adopted; and in a sense often used in the courts, all of those
may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to
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see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters
the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the.written laws, and fundamental organization of every
religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with
minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost every
case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle
would depriie these bodies of the fight of construing their
own church laws, would opdn the way to all the .evils which
we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of Lord ELDONand would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where propperty rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical
questions.
And this is piecisely wtat the Oourt of Appeals of Kentucky did in the case of Matson V. Avery. Uder cdover of idquiries into the jurisdiction of the synod and presbytery over
the congregation, and of the general assembly over all, it went
into an elaborate examinatiov of the principles of Presbyterian
Church goverameftt, and ended by overruling the decision qf
the highest judicatbijr of that church in the Unithd Sate , bbtli
on the jurisdiction and the merits; and substituting its own
ji'dgnient f6t that df ttie ebolegiastical couft, decides that rling
elders, declared to b guch by that tribunal, are not such, .and
must not be recognized by the congregation, though four-fifth4
bf its members believe in the judgment of the assembly and
desired to conform to its debiee.
But we need pursue this subjedt no further. Whativbf may
have been the case before the Kentucky court, the appellants
i the case presented td is hav6 separated theniselv~s wholly
from the organization to which they belonged when this controversy commenced. They now deny its juthority, denounce
its action, and refuse to abide by its judgments. They have first
erected themselves into a new organization and have since
joined themselves to another t6tally different, if not hostile,
to the one to which they belonged when the difficulty first began. Under any of these decisions which we have examined,
the appellants, in their present position, have no right to the
property, or to the use of it, which is the subject of this suit.
The novelfy of the questions presented to this court for the
first time, their intrinsic importance and far-reaching influence,
and the knowledge that the schism in which the case originated
has divided the Presbyterian churches throughout Kentucky
and Missouri, have seemed to us to justify the careful and laborious examination and discussion which we have made of
the principles which should govern the case.
For the same reasons we have held it under advisehient
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for a year; not uninfluenced by the hope that since the civil
commotion, which evidently lay at thefoundationof the trouble,
has passed away; that charity, which is so large an element in
the faith of both parties, and which, by one of the apostles or that
religion is said to be the greatest of all the Christian virtues,
would have brought about a reconciliation.
But we have been disappointed. It is not for us to determine or apportion the moral responsibility which attaches to
the parties for this result. We can only pronounce the judgment of the law as applicable to the case presented to us, and
that requires lis to affirm that decree of the Circuit Court as
it stands.
The Chief Justice did not sit on the argument of this case,
and took no part in its decision.
CLIFFORD and DAVIS JJ. dissented.
The opinion of the Kentucky Court of before the General Assembly of the
Appeals, decidingmostof the questions Church, in the Kentucky Court of Apl
here discussed, so far asinvolved in the peals, and in the U. S. Supreme Court
erits of this case, with our own corn- were men of the highest character and
ments, will be found in 9 Law Reg. W. attainments, in all the qualities of emtS. 210-225, where the case is called Gar- nent judicial ability and fairness, to be
fin v. Penick, and that of the Chancellor found anywhere in the country; and
of the Louisville Chancery Court, em- for the humble editor of a law journal
bracing the same controversy, With a now to attempt to determine the right
briefreview, appearsinthesam- volume and justice of those somewhat divergpp. 401-415, under the name of Futon V. ent and conflicting opinions, may natuXhrley.
rally seem to most persons not a little
1. We have carefully examined the presumptuous. But, if wesayanything,
foregoing opinion, and that of the dis- we are bound, in justice to our readers,
senting judges, and reviewed the optn- to say preclsely what we think and all
ions of theKentucky State Courts, with we think of those opinions, without rethe view of refreshing our recollection serve or evasion. And if.we do all that,
ofall the facts connected with the con- we shall feel compelled to say that the
troversy, in order, if possible, to form decisions on this subject have been unsome reasonable conjecture of the fortunate to all concerled, in our humgrounds of such surprising dIvergence ble judgment. But they have becin
of opinion among men and judges of made uniquestionably in all good faith
such wisdom and experience, and upon and honesty, and must be recognized as
a subject apparently of no peculiar dif- existing facts.
ficulty.
We must begin, then, by repeating
But there seems no adequate solution what Wve have before said of the two
of the apparent mystery, except in the former opinions, at the time of publicawell-known, but oft forgotten fact, that tion in this journal, that they seem to
when partizan zeal and passion are al- us based upon entirely false principles,
lowed to sway opinions, even with the and every way calculated to widen the
wisest and best men, no one need be breach which they should have studi
surprised at any result, however pre- ously labored to heal and close up. The
posterous or absurd it may seem to opinion of Mr. Justice MILLra, with the
those not within the range of such in- spirit of dignified judicial reserve, very
fluences.
proper within reasonable limits, seems
There can be no question, probably, studiously to keep out of view all the
that the men who have decided the car- facts connected with the original condinal question upon which this embit- troversy, except those which seemed
tered controversy turns, or has been indispeiisable to the comprehension ot
made to turn, at the three several times, his opinion, and most favorable to its
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adoption. Wewilistate, therefore, some advised. Nothing could have been
lew more of these facts, in order to more so. If the men who exercised
rcurler our own comments more intelli- such disciplinary powers had not been
rendered as insane s theirantagonists.
gible.
1. It vill appear by reference to the by the mad passions engendered by the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, and civil strife of the country, It is not to
the papers there referred to, that the be supposed they would have done as
effect of the discipline exercised by the they did. All we can say, therefore, is
General Assembly of the church would that*unquestionably both parties are
be to cut off and virtually excommuni- equally sincere-and both, in a moral
cate about three-fourths of thirmem- point of view,just about eqtiallyin fault,
bership in the State of Kentucky-and and as is not uncoinmon in religious
this, not upon the ground of any overt and especially political controversies,
act of disloyalty of a criminal charac- that party having the power proceeded
ter, as amounting either to treason or at-once to crush out and exterminate
misprision of treason, but solely for en- the other. There could scarcely have
tertaining and expressing opinions up. been any action of the majority more
on the subject of slavery and State upcharitable or unchristian, and surely
rights, not in entire conformity with nothing less calculated to heal the
those of the General Assembly-or, in- breach. But as we said in our former
deed, with what we ourselves have al- comments, we should feel compelled to
ways regarded as the wisest and sound- regard the action of the General Asest constitutionalviews. But, afterall sembly as entirely within the range of
it must be confessed by the most ram- ecclesiastical jurisdiction: For while
pant and outspoken in favor of the op- the State of Kentucky remained witiin
posite opinions, they were merely ab_ the Union, as it did throughout the constract opinions, upon which men could flict, there can be no doubt of the duty
differ, and did differ, in every Stateand of every citizen or dweller, under the
country in the civilized world, and protection of such government, to yield
wheretherewas not theslightest ground it the support of loyal acts and loyal
to doubtthe entire good faith andhonest words, whatever he might think of the
sincerity of those who professed these wisdom or justice of its course. And
obnoxious opinions. It was then little no doubt any church, inspired by any •
short of madness in this free country, such burning zeal asseemedto demand
where men choose and change their re- such action, might very naturally im-.
ligious opinions at will, from day to port and exalt the duty of allegiance,
day, to attempt to place them under which is mainly a political duty, into
religious discipline and censure for the sphere of moral, or even religious
these speculative opinions upon mere obligation, and having wisely or unconstitutional law. There could scarce- wisely done so, It became the duty of
ly have been anything more unreason- all its memliers to conform to such unable or offensive, or more calculated to usual demands upon their forbearance
exasperate those holdingsuch ill-found- or their submission. And upon failure
ed opinions, but which they would belit- to do so, we do not well comprehend
tIle likely to surrender at the beck of an why the church Judicatory might not
over-bearing ecclesiastical judicatory. enforce against the offending members
Allofus can easily comprehend the fol y the penalties of such spiritual censures
ofany such course, bymakingthecase or forfeitures as they might deem apour own. And although our opinions propriate. We should feel compelled
have been vindicated by the event of to agree in opinion, mainly, with the
the war, and may now fairly claim al- deliverances ofMr. Justice MILLEr upon
ways to have been the truth, yet it is this partof thecase. For unless ecclesiby no means certain that men suffer astical courts and assemblies can be
martyrdom any mnore willingly, or sure- allowed this extent of authority, to dely in defense of truth than of error. cide their own controversies in their
To every sincere heart, his own opin- own way, when fairly within the range
ions are the truest; they must be so to of spiritual jurisdiction, they will be
him, or the world could not be held to- far more helpless than any mere volungether. The proceeding of the assem- tary association, than even an arbitra.
bly was, therefore, to say the best, se- tor appointed by the parties to a convere and arbitrary, and exceedingly Ill tract or a controversy. But the power
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to decide a question, and the wisdom
of the justice of the decision, rest no
doubt upon entirely different grounds.
The power may be most hnquestionable, and the decision most unreasonable, or even absurd, as the reports of
the judicial decision throughout the
country will abundantly show. . We
must therefore conclude that, although
the action of the General Assembly was
unquestionably valid, as was the as.tion
of Queen Mary, of England, in burning
lieretics, it was nevertheless clearly oppressiye and tyrannical, and therefore
iinjust and essentially wronginamoral
point of view; the very opposite of
what it should have been, it was nevertheless valid in strict law. It was no
4oubt well for the General Assembly to
condemn the disloyal conduct of its
mnembers in the same spirit, and
unilsh the offenders to the same ex"
tent they would condemn any other
evi opinion or action, and punish the
offenders. But under the circumstances
was cerireat forbearance and wisdom
tainly demanded, in regard to the
reatment of iubh intense and honest
opinions upon mere abstract principles
id
those essentially of a political
6baraeter. If the assembly of the
4hurch could live called into action
the requ'isite degree of Christian forbearh ce ahd charity, to have waited
fill the event of the war, all divisions
would speedily have been healed. But
by reason of the ill-advised course
'rhich they did pursue, they have rendered a small matter the source of all
l'ut incurable rancor. The decision of
the General Assembly was therefore as
bad as it could have been, and gave
great occasion to the subjects of their
discipline to feel that the course might
have been inspired, more or less, by
partisan political zeal, which they, no
doubt, did feel and believe in all sincerity, and which led them to appeal
to the civil courts, which brings
us to the second division of this
unfortunate controversy, the
decision of the State Court.
This too seems tous every way unfortunate and ill advised. For, if the State
courts had left the matter to the correction of the church courts, it might soon
have ceased to'embitter the feelings of
the parties, and a state of comparative
peace and quiet have ensued. But the
Court of Appeals, being the court of
last resort on the question, thought the

subject matter of the controversy not
fairly within the range of ecclesiastical
cognizance, and therefore that the action of the Church Assembly was of no
force or validity whatever, and, as to
nil legal etrect, left matters just where
thev would have been if no such action
had takenI place. We have on former
occasions above referred to, said all we
desired to say upon the legal soundness of this decision of the Court of
Appeals, and the cases bearing on the
point will be found in our former note.
We agree fully with Justice MILLFE,
that the decision of tile Court of Appeals Is not supported, either by tile
Just application of piinciples or of the
authorities, and ought never to have
been made, and indeed should be got
rid of, if you please, in any legal mode.
But all this does not seem to us fairly
to meet the present legal diffculties in
the case. For the Kentucky Court of
Appeals have made the decision, and It
now stares us full in the face, bad as it
is. And this decision is now the law of
Kentucky, and no other court on earth
has any power to alter it. It can only
be altered by statute of the Legislature
or by reversal in the same court. No
good lawyer can entertain any doubt
that the church courts are to be regarded as subordinate in all respects,
and wholly dependent upon the rules
of law established by the decisions ot
thehighest State tribunals. The extent
of thdjurisdiction of all inferior courts,
whethereivil or ecclesiastical, must depend upon the final decision of the
Court of Appeals. Any otherr We must
lead inevitably to inextricable confusion. It is a point which requires no
argument with lawyers. It is to all
legal apI rehension the most fundamental, and at the same time the most
elementary, of constitutional prificiples, and is in its nature so simple that
no argument or Illustration can render
it more so.
And this ruleappliedas much and as
invincibly to theU. S. Supreme Court
as to the humblest State tribumml. For
that court, although in one sense, and
within certain limits, it is a most august and imperial tribunal, has no such
functions' when it sits to try a cause between party and party, on the ground
that such parties are citizens of different States. In this latter capacity it
acts virtually in aid of the State courts
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in the trial of aparticular class of cases, risdiction, thby must say that here was
which mightequally well betriedin the an invincible barrier against all inter.
State courts andwhichnodoubtwould ference with the property, while in the
have been left exclusively to that juris- custody of the State courts; and this
diction but for the apprehension, at they do say. And as Courts of Equity,
the time the Constitution was adopted, when called upon to decide the rights
that there would be found moreperfect of property, or possession in regard to
impartiality in the national courts ; an property, real or personal, will never
apprehension not fully justified by ex- interfere, unless they can not only
perience, undertheprovision. Andthe make a final decree, but also carry the
national courts in trying this class of same into effect, we might naturally
cases not only act In aid of the State suppose the court would have been
courts,andvirtually as State courts, but satisfied to deny all furtherjurisdiction
as subordinate tribunals to the highest in the case. If any humble State Court
court In the State; Aince their decisions of Equity had so assumed to assert Juupon questions of locallaw arerequired risdiction.over a cause, respecting the
by the act of Congress to conform to title and right of possession of properthose of the highest courtin the State, or ty then in the custody of the national
what is the same thing in other words. courts, it would, no doubt, as it justly
the law of the State. And, although deserved, have been admonished that
the national courts have attempted no such half-way Jurisdiction existed
some refinements in some former de- among Courts of Equity of concurrent
cisions, in order to escape from the op- jurisdiction, and that it must desist, or
eration of this rule of decision, it still meet the consequences of having its de
-abides, and is none the less of binding c4ree utterly disregarded.
obligation and duty, because that court
We have examined the reports, first
begins to struggle to escape from it, as and last, a good deal upon this question
may be inferred pretty obviously from ofconcurrentjurisdtetion, in Courts of
Equity, and we can find no case in any
the opinion in the present case.
3. We desire to say something more mannerapproacbingthepresent; where
especially upon this question of the one court has the custody of the subec;
rule of law, applicable to this case in matter of the controversy, which is
the United States SupremeCourt. That here conceded, and another court of
question is virtuallyignored, as weread concurrent jurisdiction still assumes to
the opinion, by the learned Judge dellv- take jurisdiction of the parties and deIng the opinion, as much as if it did not cree what use they are to make of the
exist. We are not much surprised at property which the coardinate court
this, since it must have aVery awkward has just decreed to them, and in such
bearing upon the detion of that court, decree declared the legal uses. If such
in the present case, when fairly and a course of proceedings deserves any
justly applied. But we are surprised other name than that of a blunder or a
that ajudge of the deserved good re- farce, then we must confess to having
putation of 3Mr. Justice MILLER should studied equity to little purpose. We
not have more felt the embarrassments believe there can be but one opinion In
attending the entertaining jurisdiction regard to the entire unquestionable
at all in this case than is to be gathered soundness of the dissenting opinion,
from the opinion. The entire property and we especially regret that anything
which forms the subject matter of the so plainly andpalpablyatvarlancewith
controversy, was in the formal and established principles should have ocactual custodyof areceiverof theState curred in our highest national tribunaL
courLt. The national courts could not For in other countries, everywhere inthen interfere with, or makeanydecree deed where the English equity law preconcerning it, without the express and vails, it will be regarded as quite inflagrant violation of the rule establish- comprehensible that only two of tle
ed by repealed decisions in defense of eight judges of that court should have
their own jurisdiction, as against the comprehended the weight of the imniterlerence of the State couf'ts. Un- pediments against theJurisdiction. The
less then the court were prepared to es form of the decree which the national
tablish one rule for the national courts courts have thus attempted togive in a
and another for the State courtsin re- matter so entirely one side of their lawgard to the just limits of exclusive Ju ful Jurisprudence, can be of no force
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whatever as against the decree of the constitutional provision of the national
CourtofAppeals. Andwhythereshould government. In the latter case the Su.
have existed any desire on the part of preme Court of the United States stood
the national courtsthus tointrude their in the imp osingattitude of the imperial
jurisdiction overa meresideissuenever tribunal oflast resort, and couldnot be
made in the pleadingsas we understand requiredtoaccept the rules oflaw from
them, is certainly more that we can any sour I except its own sense of juscomprehend. If it did not come froma tice and right. But in the former case,
ucry august tribunal, and supported by as the national courts were exercising
an elaborate argumentfrom averyable a jurisdiction strictly in aid of the State
and learned judge, we would say it ap- courts, in order to avoid uncertainty in
peared very childish and afforded an- the law ofthe State and consequent conother proof of the proverb aliquando fusion, it became absolutely necessary
bonus dormitatlInomerus. It seems only to prescribe an uniform rule of decision
explainable upon thd ground that the This couldlfairly be expected to come
court supposed the moral force of the only from the determination of the
opinion would have great weight, and courts of last resort in the State. The
might thus tend to do good in showing act of Congress, therefore, with great
the parties the only legal mode of es- justice an propriety, provided that in
cape from the controversy. Andprob- all such caes..and in all others where
ably the great and good man who gave the national courts were exerctsing a
a somewhat similar opinion in that privatejurisdiction, betweenparty and
courtjust before the civil war thought partytheirdecisionshould be made to
the same. We make io question this conform to the law of the State
might have been theresulthere had the where made. This when made. And
matter lrst come before this court, and it is no answer to this pirovision
then received the same determination that the State courts have alterhere attempted to be given: for then it ed their rule of decision upon any
would havehadtheweightofajudicial particularpoint, and that the national
judgment. But we conjecture it will courts willfollowtlieforimerrulc whennow be too late for any oiter opinion ever they regard that as the betterlaw.
of this character to produce any such For the purpose of the provision being
good results. It is bestasageneral rule to preserve uniformity of decision in
no doubt, for all courts, of however au- the State, it no more meets its spirit
gust character, to keep within the le- and intent! for the national courts to
gitimate sphere oftheirappropriateju- conform to some former rule of the
risdiction, and not attempt to read State court, which that court has dehomilies to their fellow-citizens, how- elared erroneous, than it would to folever wise orfriendly such homiliesmay low some statute ofthe State which had
be.
since been repealed.
The law of the highest judicial tribuBut in discussing this question of jnrisdlction we havealmost forgotten our nal of the State upon matters of con.
last starting point: the proper rule of tract or of private right between party
law which must control the case. Upon and party, is the rule by which such
this point weinust bebrief, and aswhat contract or such private right exists
we say will be butaresuWn,it may have and can only fairly be measured or conthe appearance in some sense of repeti- strued. It would, therefore be the only
tion. Thecontrolling anthorityonthis rule of law bywhichthenationalcourts
point must always be the Act of (;on- could decide in such cases, if there were
gress establishing and defining the jur- no act of Congress requiring it. It is
risdictionofthenationalcourts.already the rule, and the only rule, by which
referred to in the opinion ofthelearned any foreign court or any court in any
judge. The framers of that act were otherof the States could be allowed to
vise and far-seeing men, and did not govern their decisions upon the same
fill to comprehend the different atti- questions. And the national courts
Itdes of the national courts indeciding have no more right or authority to de(auses between citizens of different clare the law of Kentucky in a cause
f;tate. and when entertaining writs of between party and party than any for,wror to the State courts, to revise all eign tribunal, which indeed those
tuestions determined by those courts courts are in all such cases.
gainst the validity of any statute or
Upon the just and fair applicalion ot
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this rule it would be impossible for the
national courts in this case to prescribe
to the parties in this cause any other
rule of law for the government of their
conduct than those rules which the
Court of Appeals had already declared
in the very same cause, having full and
final jurisdiction over it. And the attempt to do this, on the ground that
the decision of that court was not sound
law, or not in accordance with its former decisions, has certainly very much
the appearance of an evasion, or voluntary disregard both of the act of
Congress and the general rules of law
applicable to the subject; for it is no
argument in the case- to say, what we
freelyadmit, that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is not the soundest
law; that it might better have been decided the other way, unless indeed the
Supreme Court are sitting as a Court
of Appeal or of Error from that judgment, which wili not be claimed. It is
in fact a co-ordinate and subordinate
court, acting in aid of the State courts,
and has no more right to go counter
to the decisions, of the Court of Appeals than any district court or justices' court in the State. It imports nothing that this court is the highest
court in the nation.
It is acting
in no such capacity in giving this judgment; and if the Lnrd Chancellor of
England was allowed by act of Parliament to hold county courtsin an emergency, he must then be governed by the
same rules of law which govern other
county court judges.
If we have madd ourselves intelligible
It is all we desire. We trust we have
spoken both of the court and the opinIon, with all due respect, which we
sincerely feel and desire never to forget, and it is scarcely needful for us to
declare that we have no apprehension
that any verS- awful consequences are
to follow fron: this rather unseemly
effort to grabp ji, -isdiction,even by the
halves, of this alnmest national controversy, but presente1 in no national
form. We do not affect to see in it, as
some wiser men than we claim to be
may do, any disposition iL,the national
courts to override the State eourts and
trample upon and stamp (at the last
vestige of the light of State sov ereignty
or State rights.
We only desire to make one further
query: Whether it can be possible that

all the judges who indorse this judgment gave the subject so slight consideration, that it did not occur to them
that this half-way jurisdiction which
they were attempting to carve out of
the case, which was exclusively under
the cognizance and control of another
court, if ever attempted to be enforced,
must inevitably prohuce the same conflict between the State and national
tribunals, which all thedecisions of that
court, and this in particular, so much
deprecate and so studiously avoid. We
have only to suppose that the elders
and trustees recognized by the decree
of the Court of Appeals as rightfully
entitled to exercise the functions of
those offices, and to whose custody and
dontrol that court commits the church
property, should insist upon following
the doctrine of the decree under whic4
they hold and administertheproperty;
and should consequently refuse to be
governed by the requirements of the
national courts in their half and half
decree, and that the latter courts should_
proceed to enforce their decree.
The n,,xt step in equity procedure, as
we understand it, will. be for those
holdingand administering the property
under the decree of the Court of AI:
peals, to apply to that court for a writ
of assistance, and to have it enforced
by the posse of the county. Do the Supreme Court of the United States seriously expect, under this state of
affairs, that the Court of Appeals will
desist from enforcing their decree until
"ompelled to do so by military force?
How then is a conflict between the authorities to be avoided? It might not
seem altogether a pertinent question
to propound to the court, but one cannothelpentertaningithimself,whether
any national administration, not absolutely bent upon destruction, would
ever presume to enforce any such de
cree as this opinion directs, by military
force; we trust no suchmadnes willbe
attempted inourday. The opinion will,
we trust, be regarded as chiefly valuable for the good law it contains Upon
the merits of the questions involved in
the controversy before the Court of
Appeals, but which, unfortunately, had
been decided the other way by the only
court having proper jurisdiction of the
questions, or whoseJudgment was final
in regard to them.
•
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